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Summary 
 
The research question in this study addresses actor-level autonomy as enacted by civil 
servants within an international bureaucracy, namely the WTO Secretariat. The objective is to 
identify underlying mechanisms arguably responsible for inciting patterns of behaviour 
among civil servants.   
 
This study is premised on the assumption that autonomy may be studied by examining 
behavioural patterns of the incumbents and that such behavioural patterns largely are a 
consequence of mechanisms of pre-socialization, re-socialization and organizational 
affiliation. The study consists of two main parts. The first part is descriptive and addresses 
actor-level autonomy, whereas the second part is explanatory and seeks to identify the driving 
forces behind the emergence of supranational, departmental and epistemic behavioural 
dynamics.  
 
The main conclusions drawn from this study is that the WTO Secretariat may reinforce and 
shape behavioural patterns in particular, and that these are related to the emergence of actor-
level autonomy. Furthermore, the Secretariat is invested with the power to influence the 
outcomes of global policies through various formal and informal channels.  Additionally, the 
study finds that pre-socialization is largely responsible for evoking supranational behavioural 
logics, and that re-socialization primarily impacts on departmental and epistemic behavioural 
dynamics, whereas organizational affiliation is unequivocally linked to departmental 
behavioural logics.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Through the ever-evolving process of global governance the world has become exceedingly 
interdependent by an intertwined array of intensified action and cooperation across national 
boarders. International organizations (IOs) have come to play an increasingly significant role 
as imperative facilitators of such comprehensive networks of transnational cooperation. 
Traditionally, permanent secretariats of IOs have been viewed as neutral, state-controlled 
bureaucracies, commissioned to execute merely administrative functions (e.g. Moravcisk). 
Conventional scholarship was more concerned with the overall importance of IOs and 
ascribed little importance to the aggregated outcome of actions and performance of IO 
secretariats. However, the nature of IO research has undergone significant changes throughout 
the past decades and new emphasis has been placed on the role of international bureaucracies.  
The question of understanding and explaining their actions is increasingly addressed (e.g. Ege 
and Bauer in Reinalda 2013). 
 
Broadly speaking, bureaucratic autonomy refers to the extent to which “officials, in their 
actual behaviour, are constrained by the interests and actions of other actors, like the political 
leadership, interest groups, news media, and international organizations” (Egeberg 1998). It 
becomes increasingly evident that the actions and outcomes of international bureaucracies 
may dissent from the intentions of their creators. The gap between mechanisms of control and 
contesting actions of bureaucracies on one hand, and their de facto exercise on public 
authority on the other (Venzke 2010), has sparked a new line of research within public 
administration (PA) and IO scholarship. Bureaucratic autonomy has attracted much attention 
the past years, primarily due to their inherent powers challenging the conventional pattern of 
state-centric control of international policy making. In addition to conducting administrative 
functions, international bureaucracies increasingly influence politics by initiating and 
implementing international affairs. Over the last few years, a new wave of PA research has 
provided ample support for the assertion that international bureaucracies are not necessarily 
instruments of states, but rather, active and independent policy-making institutions (e.g. 
Trondal et. al 2010, Ege and Bauer 2013, Reinalda 2013).  
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Applying PA perspectives to the investigation of international bureaucracies marks a 
relatively new turn in the research on IOs seen that this field traditionally has been the domain 
of IR scholars (Reinalda 2013). While IR literature undoubtedly has provided invaluable 
insights on the importance IOs on the global arena, it has largely neglected effects of 
organizational features and transformations induced by the continuous expansion of 
globalization and processes of integration.  
 
The effectiveness of bureaucracies relies heavily on the ability of autonomous action, i.e. the 
capabilities to act in accordance with own aspirations and ambitions without being haltered or 
vetoed by elected authorities (e.g. Ellinas and Suleiman 2012). Sources of bureaucratic 
autonomy and authority are thus interesting objects of study. Central to the theories of 
bureaucratic autonomy is the assumption that autonomous action is fuelled by independence 
on the actor-level within an organization (e.g. Trondal et.al 2010). This study adopts this 
approach and views actor-level autonomy as a crucial source of independence in international 
bureaucracies. 
 
Arguably, actor-level autonomy is measured by supranational, departmental and epistemic 
behavioural dynamics among international civil servants. This study is grounded on the 
assumption that such behavioural logics are related to certain formal and informal traits 
embedded in the organizational and institutional context of international bureaucracies.  
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
This study is a case study of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat and is intended 
to be a contribution to the literature examining international bureaucracies from a PA 
perspective. The research aims at addressing the question of the impact of informal and 
formal structures on behavioural dynamics, which in turn is assumed to amplify independence 
amongst international civil servants.   
 
The research question is as follows: 
 
To what extent are WTO officials independent, and what can account for actor-level 
autonomy in the WTO Secretariat?  
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The aim of the study is twofold. Firstly, it aspires to elucidate actor-level autonomy within the 
Secretariat, that is, how the officials may be able to influence and shape the outcome of WTO 
policies and politics. The underlying assumption is that various organizational and 
institutional attributes evoke supranational, departmental and epistemic behavioural 
dynamics, which in turn foster identity formation that goes beyond the nation-state. This 
connotes a shift of loyalty away from the national preferences towards the international cause. 
The consequences of such are assumed to be a community of international civil servants who 
primarily regard themselves to be on a global mission detached from national preferences, 
demands and interests, and whose prime objective is the prosperity of the international cause 
to which they are committed.  
 
The second objective of the study is to offer explanations for actor-level autonomy by 
evaluating the organizational framework and the institutional environment. Drawing on 
contemporary PA research on international bureaucracies, this study is premised on the 
assumption that mechanisms of pre-socialization, re-socialization and organizational 
affiliation are key contributors in evoking aforementioned behavioural dynamics.  
 
The questions posed are both empirically and theoretically relevant. A growing number of 
studies of international executive organs validate the view that such bureaucracies continue to 
manifest themselves as independent actors, indicating a significant shift of power of the 
global executive order (e.g. Trondal et.al 2010, Reinalda 2013). In order to understand the 
process leading up to this shift of power, it is necessary to scrutinize the conditions and 
premises that encourage the developments of such among international civil servants.  
 
The European Commission has traditionally been regarded as a showcase for actor-level 
autonomy and has thus been subjected to extensive research. Yet, due to the fact that the 
Commission was widely perceived as being sui generis in nature, there were generally little or 
no comparative studies. The realist-dominated tradition within international politics ascribed 
little importance to international bureaucracies; instead, they were viewed as mere tools for 
nation states to push their agendas onto the international stage.  Since the 1990s, however, the 
claim about the sui generis character of the Commission has been challenged and a number of 
comparative studies have been put forward. Scholars began to direct attention towards other 
international organizations, aspiring to identify similar mechanisms and outcomes as observed 
within the Commission.  
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The WTO depicts an interesting case not only because it is a large and powerful executive 
operating on the world stage, but also due to the numerous organizational traits that are 
similar to that of the Commission. Comparative studies appear to suggest that “bureaucratic 
autonomy may be fostered equally inside bureaucratic organizations if they supply fairly 
similar capacities and in-house socialization processes” (Trondal & Veggeland 2013). Not 
unlike the European Union, whilst member states may legitimately push for national interests, 
the Secretariat must defend and consider the interests of the organization as a whole. Potential 
shifts and alterations in the balance of power within the WTO arguably entail serious 
consequences for the outcome of world politics.  
1.2 Literature Review 
IOs have long been the domain of IR scholarship.  Various forms of collaboration efforts 
between governments during the 19th century Europe marked the beginning of the emergence 
of comprehensive networks of cooperation between nation states, and subsequent 
developments of inter-state cooperation fuelled increasingly extensive debates regarding the 
function and importance of IOs. These debates were essentially structured around the two 
main paradigms of IR theory, namely realism on one hand and liberalism on the other.  
Realism is a state-centric theory postulating that nation states, driven by competitive self-
interest, are the main actors within international politics. Realists maintain that IOs have little 
real influence on world politics seen that the international arena is dominated by national 
interests and preservation. In contrast, liberalism holds that states may cooperate and that 
interaction between nations ultimately will result in less inter-state conflict. Despite viewing 
IOs differently, both approaches consider IOs as intergovernmental actors, i.e. actors that are 
controlled by nation states and have no de facto decision-making powers or authority. During 
the 1940s, realism emerged as the prevailing IR paradigm (Reinalda 2013). According to 
realist theory, IOs are created by states, dependant on them and act for their interest. IOs are 
thus seen as mere reflections of power distribution without any independent effect on state 
behaviour (Andreev 2007).  
 
The debate took a new turn during the 1960s when the emerging process of European 
integration sparked new controversy on the existence of IOs. In 1969 Robert Keohane 
challenged the realist school of thought by arguing that studying IOs simply “because they are 
there” overshadows a more significant point. The fact that IOs are there, in a physical form 
with norms, rules and practices makes them “living collectivities interacting with their 
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environments” and bestows them with certain properties (Rochester 1993). The subsequent 
debate was driven by the realization that the increasingly complex international community 
entailed substantial consequences for domestic policies. Besides presenting a complex model 
of interdependence as a rival to realism, the debate also gave rise to the term “international 
regimes” which intended to encapsulate the “clusters of rules, institutions and conventions 
that go beyond the formal definition of IOs” (Reinalda 2013:7). It is worth noting, however, 
that such liberal institutionalist approaches remained state-centric and argued that “…IOs in 
the contemporary world are not powerful independent actors, and relatively universal actors 
such as the United Nations (UN) find it extraordinarily difficult to reach agreements on 
certain significant issues” (Keohane and Nye 1974 in Andreev 2007). 
 
In the years that followed, various approaches to IOs emerged from both liberal and realist 
camps, yet the realist tradition remained the dominating paradigm. In 1979 Kenneth Waltz 
introduced structural realism, which differed from the classical notion in that it maintained 
that structural constraints, and not strategy or motivation as in the original approach, would 
determine behaviour of states in IR. The state-centric premises of realism were challenged in 
the late 1980s when the arising sociological or constructivist school propounded the view that 
“the social world, including IR, is a human construction and an intersubjective domain that is 
meaningful to those who engage in it” (Reinalda 2013). Constructivists rejected liberalist and 
neorealists underlying materialism arguing that the most important aspects of IR were in fact 
social, not material. To constructivists, the international system was much more than simply a 
physical entity, it was a complex system comprised of ideas, norms and beliefs. 
Constructivists argued that all institutions were socially constructed and that behaviour is 
determined by identity. The constructivist paradigm gained widespread support through 
influential articles and a book by Alexander Wendt titled “Social Theory of International 
Politics” (1999). Central to Wendt’s argument was the rejection of the neorealist position that 
identities and interests are given, and that states are aware of such before they begin 
interaction with other nations. Instead, Wendt argued that is was these processes of interaction 
that created identities and interests of states. According to Wendt, interaction with others 
“…create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure 
has no existence or casual power apart from process’” (Wendt 1992:394 in Jackson and 
Sørensen 2012:168). While Wendt was concerned with interaction between states, Martha 
Finnemore added another significant contribution to constructivist literature by directing 
attentions to norms of the international system and how these affected states. As a key point, 
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Finnemore argued  “states are socialized to accept norms, values and perceptions of interest 
by IOs” (Finnemore 1996:5 in Reinalda 2013) IOs thus act as transmitters of international 
norms and subsequently shape national politics by providing a template of interests (Jackson 
and Sørensen 2012:169). Constructivists viewed IOs not just as bureaucracies, but also as 
“social networks and patterned sets of interaction that take on a life of their own” (Oestreich 
2011:169 in Reinalda 2013). Peter Haas (1989) acknowledged epistemic communities 
potential influence on decision-making in that knowledge-based experts define the cause-and-
effect relationships of complex problems that states are confronted with, and are involved in 
the process of identifying interests and framing issues for collective debate (Reinalda 2013).  
 
Globalization, particularly the process of European integration, impelled further developments 
within studies of IOs and various theories regarding the nature and consequences of 
international cooperation were put forward. However, one major problem associated with IR 
approaches to IOs was that it rested its focus on explaining the importance and existence of 
IOs and less on the implications of IOs on the international community. Organizational traits 
of IOs were largely treated as exogenous to the outcome of world politics, and thus little 
attention was given to the organizational behaviour, policy-making and transformations IOs 
underwent as a response to the changing international arena. With only a few exceptions, 
interest in an organizational analysis of IOs remained minimal (Reinalda 2013).  
 
In 1989 March and Olsen published their book “Rediscovering Institutions” in which they 
investigated how institutions influence change in politics and “regarded bureaucratic agencies 
as arenas for contending social forces and as collections of standard operating procedures and 
structures that define and defend values, norms, identities and beliefs” (March and Olsen 
1989, Reinalda 2013).  The main theoretical premise behind March and Olsen’s normative 
institutionalism was their sociological interpretation of institutions; they presumed that it was 
a “logic of appropriateness” guiding behaviour of actors and that this logic was driven by the 
prevailing norms and rules within a given institution (March and Olsen 1989). The concepts 
presented by March and Olsen gained wide support in the scientific community and is often 
referred to as the starting point of the neo-institutional turn (Ørsten 2008:146). The core 
argument behind their neo-institutional approach may be summarized as follows: “…life is 
organized by sets of shared meanings and practices that come to be taken for a given for a 
long time…actors act and organize themselves in accordance with rules and practices which 
are socially constructed, publicly known and accepted” (March and Olsen 1994:4-5 in Ørsten 
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2008:146). The logic of appropriateness thus views action as the outcome of a matching 
between situation, roles and rules. Behaviour derives from a specific set rules that govern the 
appropriate course of action given a specific role or identity (Balsiger 2013).  
 
During the 1990s researchers began directing attention towards autonomy. Rational choice 
institutionalism proposed a rather straightforward explanation of autonomy by viewing the 
relationship between member states and a bureaucracy as a principal-agent relationship, in 
which the principal delegates, but does not cede authority to the agent (Reinalda 2013). In 
their rational choice analysis of delegation, Darren Hawkins and others found that principals 
delegate authority and allow for a marginal degree of autonomy in order for agents to perform 
a task more efficiently than would be the case if the principal themselves carried it out (van 
Bogdandy et al. 2010:73).  Drawing on realist and liberalist ideas, rationalist approaches 
nonetheless accentuated the role of nation-states at the international arena (e.g Pollack 2003) 
and were consequently criticized for neglecting the importance of institutional factors and 
failing to explain agenda-setting within international organizations (Barnett and Finnemore 
2004). Constructivist literature, such as the one presented by Barnett and Finnemore, 
emphasized the institutional aspect and maintained that core aspects of decision-making 
within IOs are socially constructed, i.e. they acknowledged the importance of social practices 
and interaction as a stimulant of socialization and social learning (e.g. Checkel 2005). While 
Barnett and Finnemore had used the terms bureaucracy and organization alternatingly, Frank 
Biermann and Bernd Siebenhüner narrowed down the definition of international 
bureaucracies to merely involve the secretariats (“Managers of Global Change: the Influence 
of International Environmental Bureaucracies” 2009) (Reinalda 2013). The same authors 
also concluded that international bureaucracies were more interested in resolving political 
problems than increasing their own powers. Relying on organizational theory and its 
empirical notions of organizational cultures and internal procedures, they conducted studies of 
international bureaucracies as social processes and collective entities comprised of their 
distinct cultures, structures and behaviours (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009, Reinalda 2013). 
The empirical data validated the assumption that bureaucracies have substantial influence as 
actors in global environmental policy by acting as knowledge brokers, negotiation facilitators 
and capacity builders (Reinalda 2013). Overall, developments during the 1990s gradually 
acknowledged international bureaucracies as independent actors, thus called for a research 
agenda focusing on bureaucratic autonomy and its implications for the international 
community.  
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To recapitulate, because traditional schools of thought largely were concerned with debating 
the general importance of IOs, bureaucratic autonomy was long an understudied area in 
literature. Developments taking place in the second half of the 20th century fuelled renewed 
interest and debate on IOs, adding more dimensions and sub-disciplines to already existing 
theories in addition to introducing entirely new concepts and theoretical directions. IR 
understanding of IOs gradually evolved, as did the realization that traditional theoretical 
frameworks proved insufficient in providing an understanding of growing international 
interdependency and its implications. Scholars consequently began to investigate IOs and 
their secretariats by combining theories from various disciplines such as sociology and 
management studies (Reinalda 2013).  
 
Research on international bureaucracies turned over a new leaf when PA scholars began to 
take interest in the ways formal and informal structures could provide explanations for 
behaviour and its subsequent outcomes. Their interest was sparked by the fact that domestic 
politics became increasingly affected by collective decisions in which IOs were involved. PA 
scholars conceived IOs as an additional level of policy-making in an already complex and 
multileveled system (Ege and Bauer 2013). While IR scholarship persisted to view the 
international level as primarily a function of interactions between states, PA scholarship was 
“better equipped to conceptualize actorness” as well as the exogenous role of organizational 
features (Ege and Bauer 2013).   
 
Ege and Bauer distinguish three topics that caught the attention of PA scholars: 1) the 
functioning of the international civil service 2) management reforms and organizational 
change and 3) the influence of bureaucrats on international policy making (Ege and Bauer 
2013). Studies of supranational norms of international civil servants (eg. Hooghe 2005, 
Ellinas and Suleiman 2012) fall under the first category, while the investigation of 
organizational implications of formal rules and procedures, as well as recent comparative 
studies of international administrations (e.g Trondal et.al 2010) are studied under the umbrella 
of the second tier. The third category recognizes that IOs matter “independently and 
autonomously of their national governments principals” and focuses on how such 
independence has been conceived in recent decades (Ege and Bauer 2013). It distinguishes 
between principal-agent approaches, rooted in rational-choice intuitionalism, on one hand and 
sociological constructivism on the other. The former largely views IOs, notably their 
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secretariats, as unitary agents and focus on control and independence whereas the latter 
emphasizes IOs a bureaucratic organization that ultimately develops a life of its own by 
focusing on values, perception and culture (Ege and Bauer 2013). In their influential book 
“Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics” (2004) Barnett and 
Finnemore rejected the notion of IOs as mere servants of their principals and drew on 
“…Weberian understanding of bureaucracy to create a common analytical framework for 
evaluating different kinds of authority in international bureaucracies.” They intended to 
demonstrate how such authorities enabled the bureaucracy to influence organizational policy 
making and argued that it was in fact of less importance what the bureaucracies were formally 
mandated to do, and of more importance what kind of authority they possessed and how such 
authority may be utilized (Ege and Bauer 2013).  
 
The so-called “third generation” of IO studies aspired to go one step further by “studying the 
criteria for and patterns, varieties and dynamics of international bureaucracies” (Trondal et. al 
2010:10). The overarching goal was thus to identify different behavioural dynamics within 
international bureaucracies as well as addressing the “potential impact of structural traits, such 
as decision-making rules and bureaucratic hierarchies on organizational behaviour and policy 
making” (Ege and Bauer 2013). Central to this study, their book “Unpacking International 
Organizations – the Dynamics of Compound Bureaucracies” (Trondal et. al 2010) rests on 
the assumption that international civil servants find themselves amidst an inbuilt tension 
between primarily four behavioural logics; intergovernmental, supranational, departmental 
and epistemic dynamics, and that the subsequent interplay of these dynamics ultimately guide 
“behaviour and actions of actors because roles provide ‘conceptions of reality, standards of 
assessment, affective ties and endowments (…) and capacity for purposeful action´” (March 
and Olsen 1995:30, Selden 1997:140 in Trondal et. al 2010:13).  
 
The aforementioned research was motivated by the lack of studies exploring the relationship 
between bureaucratic structures of international bureaucracies and behavioural logics among 
staff (Trondal 2010b). The following empirical inquiry countered four of the conventional 
claims in existing research. Firstly, contrary to existing beliefs the data suggested that legal 
mandates have little explanatory value in assessing behaviour among staff. Secondly, the 
study demonstrated that size of the bureaucracy proved insufficient in accounting for 
variations of behavioural logics. Thirdly, while it was generally assumed that the IO shaped 
administrative behaviour, the data suggested that international bureaucracies rather acted 
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fairly independent of the IO in which they were embedded. Finally, the evidence revealed that 
administrative behaviour to a larger extent was conditioned by bureaucratic structures than by 
processes of socialization (Trondal 2010b).  
 
Apart from acknowledging international bureaucracies as independent actors in the system of 
global governance, the comparative study undertaken by Trondal et. al (2010) reaffirmed the 
existence of autonomy among international civil servants and strongly indicated a correlation 
between the organizational dimension and role perceptions and identities. Additionally, the 
importance of viewing political processes and systems in the context of their organizational 
framework was reestablished. Based on aforementioned research, it was noted: “international 
bureaucracies may possess considerable capacity to act relatively independently of member-
state governments” (Trondal and Veggeland 2013). Arguably, this potential is substantiated 
first and foremost through the development of autonomy deriving from formal and informal 
structures. This study contributed to the growing literature on de facto effects on international 
bureaucracies and demonstrated that – given favourable organizational capacities – actor-level 
autonomy may be fostered equally within international bureaucracies. More specifically, it 
also indicated that the Commission is not substantially different from other international 
bureaucracies (Trondal and Veggeland 2013). To go back to an earlier point, the traditional 
perception of the EU as sui generis in nature had progressively been called into question 
during the past decade and contemporary literature has largely rebutted the claim. Upon this 
acknowledgment, scholars propounded the view that mechanisms at play within the 
Commission may indeed be observed and analysed according to similar formal and informal 
characteristics within other international bureaucracies.  
 
There has been an inconclusive debate amongst PA scholars regarding concurrent causes of 
actor-level autonomy. In her article “Several Roads lead to International Norms, but few via 
International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission”(2005), Lisbet 
Hooghe found that the overall effect of international socialization in the Commission was 
fairly insignificant. In stark contrast, studies such as “Is the European Commission a 
‘Hothouse’ for Supranationalism? Exploring Actor-­‐‑Level Supranationalism” (Trondal 2007) 
countered claims that socialization processes mainly occur at the national level and endorsed 
underlying assumptions of international socialization.  Also central to this thesis is research 
conducted by Egeberg et al. (2013) which attempted to elucidate the implications of staff 
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demography on the European Parliament (EP). Based on three theoretical conjunctures, pre-
socialization, re-socialization and organizational affiliation, this research demonstrated the 
effect of formal and informal attributes on identity and role perceptions among staff within 
the EP. This debate guides the analytical frame of this study.  
1.3 Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework is governed by the study’s purpose and research question. In order 
to understand and explain actor-level autonomy this study draws on organizational and 
institutional theory. The two analytical frameworks are chosen because they are seen as being 
complementary in developing an understanding of the emergence of independence within 
international bureaucracies. 
 
The research question implicates a dependant and an independent variable, namely 
independence (actor-level autonomy) and explanations of such independence. The study is 
grounded on the premise that actor-level autonomy principally is measured by three 
behavioural dynamics: supranational, departmental and epistemic logics. Furthermore, it 
advocates the view that such behavioural dynamics to a large extent are fostered through 
mechanisms deriving from formal and informal characteristics. It primarily draws on research 
conducted by Trondal et. al (2010) as well as Egeberg et. al (2013).  
 
The analytical framework is divided into two parts. The first section seeks to provide a 
theoretical understanding of actor-level autonomy within international bureaucracies, while 
the second part presents the theoretical framework for evaluating the driving forces behind 
such independence. Behavioural patterns are studied by examining indicators as own role-
perceptions and sense of loyalty, contact patterns and cleavages of conflict. The independent 
variable, i.e. explanations of actor-level autonomy, will be analyzed across three theoretical 
pillars: pre-socialization, re-socialization and organizational affiliation, with a view to relating 
these mechanisms to the development of behavioural dynamics observed within the 
Secretariat.  
 
The organizational perspective posits that formal structures inevitably will influence and 
shape behaviour of individuals operating within it, and thus formal structures are cornerstones 
in analysing and explaining independence. Formal structures are analysed by examining the 
organizational attributes, i.e. horizontal and vertical specialization within an organization. 
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Organizational traits are complemented by intertwined social structures of norms, perceptions, 
attributes and connections, serving as guidelines for conduct. Formal and informal structures 
comprise closely interrelated attributes that are considered decisive conditions for actor-level 
autonomy to emerge and unfold. Thus, formal and informal structures need to be evaluated 
simultaneously in order to apprehend and draw conclusions on actor-level autonomy and 
causes of such. 
1.4 A Brief Description of the WTO Secretariat  
The WTO is the only as the only global actor that manages trade between nations. It was 
established in 1995 as a successor to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), 
and signified a considerable advancement in multilateralism. The main objective of the WTO 
is to spur and liberalize international trade by decreasing barriers of such as well as providing 
a framework for establishing and negotiating trade agreements. The increased importance of 
the WTO has been illustrated through continuous expansion of member states as well as 
policy areas, rules and scope of activities. The WTO is an intergovernmental rule-driven 
organization and arguably the most powerful legislative and judicial body in the world. 
 
The ministerial conference (MC) is the highest organ in the WTO. It holds supreme authority 
over all matters and is normally composed of the Ministers of Trade of the member states. 
Below the MC is the General Council (GC), which essentially is the driving force and engine 
of the whole organization. It is composed of several representatives from the member states 
and does also act as dispute settlement body and trade policy body. The GC delegates 
responsibility to three extensive bodies, namely the Councils for Trade in Goods, Trade in 
Services and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS.) The Committee of 
Trade and Development, the Committee of Balance of Payments and the Committee on 
Budget and Financing also report to the GC. Additionally, numerous committees, working 
groups and specialized parties handle arrangements and other areas. The abovementioned 
organs constitute the political level of the WTO, whereas the Secretariat comprises the 
administrative level.  
 
The Secretariat supports and assists an increasingly politicised and influential organization. 
Given that the WTO is an intergovernmental organization, the Secretariat does not have 
autonomous decision-making or initiating powers. However, it holds an important position as 
support for WTO members and key provider of expertise in WTO matters, rules and 
  13 
regulations (Trondal et. al 2010).  Responsibilities of the WTO secretariat include, amongst 
others, trade performance and trade policy analyses, assistance in trade disputes and 
interpretation of WTO rules and regulations. Provided that the WTO is a rule-driven 
organization, the Secretariat holds an important position as “guardian of treaties”. Arguably, 
through its economic and legal competences, the Secretariat has the potential to affect the 
agenda, the outcomes and the interpretations of rules (Trondal et. al 2010:96-97), thereby also 
the outcome of WTO policies and politics.  
1.5 Data and Methodology 
This study adopts a qualitative approach and draws on interviews conducted with officials 
working in the WTO Secretariat during the time period 2007-2008. These data are secondary 
as they were originally drafted and employed to conduct comparative research of behavioural 
dynamics within the Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat. The 
subsequent empirical observations and conclusions were presented in the book “Unpacking 
International Organizations – the Dynamics of Compound Bureaucracies” written by Jarle 
Trondal and his colleagues, published in 2010. Additionally, the study draws on official WTO 
documents and legal texts.  
 
The data and methodology is guided by the overall aim of the study. While quantitative data is 
an effective means of establishing patterns and correlations within a large number of 
respondents, qualitative data is frequently applied for more in-depth studies of one or a few 
cases. It often aspires to identify underlying psychological or behavioural characteristics, 
commonly investigated on the basis of observations or interviews. Qualitative research is 
consequently less concerned with discovering generalizations and more interested in 
identifying certain aspects of culture, consciousness or behaviour (Little 2014). This 
considered, a qualitative research design appears to be the most fruitful given the research 
question and purpose of this study.  
 
This study addresses the research question by undertaking a single-case study of the WTO 
Secretariat. Selecting a single-case contrary to a comparative study was largely motivated by 
the desire to investigate a fairly wide and diverse array of variables to determine the 
underlying driving forces of actor-level autonomy. A single-case study may provide a 
“nuanced, empirically-rich, holistic account of a specific phenomena” (Willis 2014).  
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1.6 Findings and Analysis 
The empirical inquiry assesses actor-level autonomy by examining behavioural patterns 
within the Secretariat, namely supranational, departmental and epistemic behavioural logics. 
It finds that there is ample support for the claim that formal and informal structure of the 
Secretariat shape and influence identity and role perceptions amongst staff by evoking 
aforementioned behavioural dynamics. Moreover, such behavioural logics represent a shift 
away from national orientations and towards a collective, supranational community of civil 
servants whose prime motivation is their common global cause.  
 
The subsequent analysis aspires to shed light on the underlying mechanisms of such 
behavioural dynamics by drawing on three theoretical pillars: pre-socialization, re-
socialization and organizational affiliations. The main conclusions drawn from the 
observations are that the Secretariat possesses considerable clout to affect the outcome of 
policies and that it is dominated by supranational, departmental and epistemic behavioural 
dynamics that externalize themselves to various degrees and under various circumstances. 
Furthermore, it is concluded that pre-socialization impacts severely on supranational 
behavioural dynamics, while re-socialization is most evident in departmental and epistemic 
behavioural logics, and lastly, organizational affiliation is strongly related to departmental 
behavioural logics.  
1.7 Outline of the Thesis 
The second chapter will present the analytical framework and the two main theoretical 
perspectives on which this study is set. It addresses mechanisms of formal and informal 
structures and aims at providing a framework for analysing and understanding these concepts.   
Chapter 3 presents the methods of data collection and the methodological approach. Chapter 4 
serves as a background chapter by firstly presenting a detailed review of the case under 
investigation, namely the WTO Secretariat, before it proceeds to outline empirical 
observations drawn from the interviews and documents. The final chapter connects the 
empirical inquiry to the theoretical considerations presented in chapter 2 and discusses the 
results in light of the analytical framework. The findings are summarized in a concluding 
section towards the end of the thesis.  
 
 
 
  15 
2. Analytical Framework 
 
This chapter intends to provide a framework for analysing and understanding the implications 
of formal and informal structures on decision-making behaviour. It will be divided into two 
parts: the first part will outline the theoretical backdrop for the dependant variable, actor-level 
autonomy. This section intends to elucidate the theoretical assumptions on which such 
independence is premised. Secondly, it will outline the independent variables and attempt to 
illustrate in what ways these may contribute to autonomy.   
 
This study presumes that actor-level autonomy is measured by supranational, departmental 
and epistemic behavioural dynamics. These behavioural logics are studied by exploring 
contact patterns, cleavages of conflict and own role perceptions. In seeking to explain actor-
level autonomy the study applies three independent variables, namely pre-socialization, re-
socialization and organizational affiliation. These are expected to impact on behavioural 
logics within the Secretariat. The independent variables have been selected on the grounds of 
their ascribed importance in previous studies of EU administration and international 
bureaucracies (e.g. Egeberg et. al 2013, Trondal et. al 2010).  
2.1 Unpacking Actor-Level Autonomy  
Autonomy is a frequently applied term, but it is often applied in different ways. As a point of 
departure, Roness et. al (2007:5) view autonomy at the level of agencies as “the level of 
decision-making competences” and proceed to point out that autonomy primarily is related to 
discretion, i.e. the extent to which the agency itself may decide about matters it finds 
important (Roness et. al 2007:5, Verhoerst et. al 2004). In response to the conceptual 
ambiguity, Cohon and colleagues (2009) identify three basic strands of the concept 
bureaucratic autonomy in the literature. The first branch views autonomy as the “ability to 
enact policies that will not be limited or overruled by other political actors”. According to this 
view, bureaucratic autonomy entails the implementation of outcomes that diverge from the 
preferences of their principals, without prevention or punishment (Cohon et. al 2009).  The 
second definition emphasizes preference formation “primarily with respect to the ability of 
agencies to shift preferences of their principals.” Central to this work, is Carpenter’s (2001) 
study of bureaucratic politics in which he defined bureaucratic autonomy as a situation in 
which “politically differentiated agencies takes sustained patterns of action consistent with 
their own wishes, patterns that will not be checked or reversed by elected authorities, 
organized interests or courts” (Carpenter 2001:14 in Cohon et. al 2009). Carpenter argued that 
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bureaucratic autonomy was conditioned by political differentiation, organizational capacity 
and legitimacy. The third branch identified by Cohon et. al (2009) explores the 
multidimensionality of bureaucratic autonomy and derives from literature focusing on the 
relationship between bureaucratic autonomy and departmental ministers in European 
parliamentary systems. There are several types of bureaucratic autonomy within this tradition 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2006:13 in Cohon et. al 2009). Verhoest and colleagues provide a 
useful conceptual mapping of bureaucratic autonomy in which they distinguish between 
“autonomy as the level of decision-making competencies” and “autonomy as the exemption 
of constraints on the actual use of decision-making competencies” (Verhoest et. al 2004). The 
latter has four components: structural autonomy, financial autonomy, legal autonomy and 
interventional autonomy (Verhoest et. al 2004). Structural autonomy refers to the extent to 
which agencies are “insulated from elected officials by intervening layers of hierarcy and 
supervision” (Verhoerst et. al 2004, Christensen 1999 in Cohon et. al 2009). Though these 
definitions highlight important sources of autonomy, the purpose of this study is to examine 
de facto autonomy by attempting to explain the effects of the three aforementioned 
independent variables. Most studies and definitions have been more concerned with the 
formal aspects of autonomy and provided a rather nebulous view of the question of what 
effectively fosters and sustains autonomy at the actor-level.  
 
In their study of autonomy and control conducted 2004 on Norwegian state agencies, Lægreid 
et. al (2006:235) emphasised the importance of structural, cultural and environmental features 
in understanding and explaining autonomy. State agencies share a number of common traits 
with international permanent secretariats in that they are the administrative branches of their 
parent institutions, from which they are also structurally disaggregated. Furthermore, they are 
comprised of civil servants tasked with executing administrative and technical assignments. 
Both national and international executive organizations are organized according to principles 
of purpose and function (Cox & Jacobsen 1973). Lægreid et. al (2006:236) argue that an 
agency’s autonomy is multidimensional and not implicitly linked to its formal legal status. 
Rather, there are numerous dimensions and aspects of autonomy occurring to varying degrees. 
In their study, Lægreid et. al (2006:244) apply three theoretical approaches on organizations: 
structural-instrumental, cultural-institutional and environmental. The first one relates to 
selection mechanisms resulting from formal structures and procedures (“bounded 
rationality”). The second approach concerns informal norms, identities and the logic of 
appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989) and the third emphasizes the significance of external 
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pressures. According to Lægreid and others (2006:244), the extent and scope of autonomy and 
control may be understood by combining these three elements. Not unlike the study 
undertaken by Lægreid and colleagues, this study combines formal and informal elements to 
understand and explain autonomy. It also adopts the view that an agency’s autonomy is not 
inherently linked to its formal legal status, but rather a result of a multidimensional set of 
formal and informal structures.  
 
From a realist and neo-liberalist point of view, international bureaucracies are seen as 
intergovernmental tools designed to facilitate nations states in pushing their causes and 
interests onto the international stage. During the past two decades, however, several studies 
examining international bureaucracies from a PA perspective have been put forward. These 
studies challenge the secular claim of the intergovernmental nature of international 
bureaucracies by viewing them as composite establishments synthesizing a variety of 
characteristics and decision-making dynamics. Early contingency theory, integration research 
and neo-institutional approaches suggest that international bureaucracies tend to combine and 
integrate a multidimensional set of decision-making structures, namely intergovernmental, 
supranational, departmental and epistemic dynamics (Trondal et al. 2010:13). International 
bureaucracies are thus multidimensional organizations with inherent decision-making 
dynamics that are constantly shaping and altering the processes and outcomes of the 
organization. Assumably, through these dynamics, international bureaucracies incite a 
complex set of behaviour and role perceptions placing guidelines and restrictions on human 
action by providing “codes for behaviour and feelings of allegiance to organized 
communities”, furthermore: “…such perceptions may guide the actual behaviour of actors 
because roles provide ‘conceptions’ of reality, standards of assessment, affective ties, and 
endowments, and (…) a capacity for purposeful action” (Trondal et. al 2010:13).  
 
Over the years, the institutions at the European – as well as the global – level have thus 
arguably become increasingly autonomous. Many scholars have challenged the traditional 
claim that international organizations are merely rule-driven Weberian bureaucracies. They 
are no longer simply passive administrative tools for nation states; instead they have 
progressively become active and independent contributors to policy-making throughout the 
international community. Autonomy is closely interrelated to actor-level autonomy. A 
supranational dynamic denotes a “shift of loyalty and a sense of Community that is integral 
and endogenous to actors’ self-perceptions” (Trondal et al. 2010:13), in other words norms 
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and values are internalized and adopted by individuals working within the institution. Upon 
realizing the potential implications entailed in these dynamics, actor-level autonomy has 
received increased attention in literature over the past few years (e.g. Hooghe 2005, Ellinas 
and Suleiman 2011). 
 
Some studies of bureaucratic autonomy have discussed the concept of representation. 
Representation as a field of study has undergone a revival in the past years. Pitkin (1972 in 
Trondal 2006b) defines representation as “the making present in some sense of something 
which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact”. Furthermore it is noted that the notion of 
representation thus “directs attention first of all, to the attitudes, the expectations and 
behaviour of the represented” (Eulau et. al 1959:743 in Trondal 2006b). It follows in the same 
line of argument, that because an individual is a representative in a symbolic sense “by what 
he is or how he is regarded” (Pitkin 1972:113 in Trondal 2006b), role representations evoked 
by civil servants are essential in determining their representational role (Trondal 2006b).  
Role perceptions significantly impact on human behaviour, especially when there is some 
degree of behavioural discretion at the actors disposal (Sen 1998:5, Wilson 1989:54 in 
Trondal 2006b:7). Studying roles as conceived by the actors themselves may consequently 
contribute to explain their behaviour (Searing 1994:14, cf. Eulau 1959:746, Wish 1980:535 in 
Trondal 2006b:7). Traditionally, representation was regarded as the relationship between the 
elected and the electorate. Newer line of research, however, has expanded the scope of 
investigation with an emphasis on the relationship between individual civil servants and their 
executive institutions. On one end of the scale, representations implies evoking roles that are 
closely and solely linked to constituents (an imperative notion of representation), whereas at 
the other end of the scale representations refers to possessing free will to evoke 
representational roles that may depart from the default position (a liberal notion of 
representation). The middle ground between these two is “occupied by an institutional 
perspective on representation where representation is gauged at balancing a complex set of 
contending representational roles (an ambiguous notion of representation)” (Trondal 2006b). 
This study adopts an ambiguous notion of representation. 
 
According to the institutional perspective roles tend to be fluid, inconsistent and constantly 
changing depending on the organizational and institutional context in which they are 
embedded. Moreover, actors will enact various roles in various situations and at different 
times (Trondal 2006b:13). The institutional perspective holds that because actors are 
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embedded within structures that direct focus on selected aspects of reality, organizational 
variables may bias actors’ choice of representational roles (Olsen 1988:167-168, 
Schattschneider 1960 in Trondal 2006b:13). For example, a study on representational roles of 
seconded national officials (SNEs) in the Commission (Trondal 2006b) identified five scope 
conditions that systematically bias the representational roles evoked, amongst them formal 
structure, organizational affiliation, intensive and sustained participation and educational 
background.  
 
Studies of international executives, such as the European Commission (e.g. Trondal 2006a) 
suggest that there is an inbuilt tension between these four behavioural dynamics. Officials 
operating in international bureaucracies often find themselves juggling multiple roles and 
affiliations evoking various behavioural logics. Trondal et. al (2010) identified four main 
groups of such behavioural logics: intergovernmental, supranational, departmental and 
epistemic behavioural dynamics. An intergovernmental dynamic indicates that officials are 
oriented towards formal mandates and tasks issued by their nation states and that their loyalty 
lies with their respective governments. On contrary, the remaining three behavioural 
dynamics weaken the intergovernmental logic by directing loyalty and devotion towards non-
national mandates. Supranational, departmental and epistemic dynamics are thus frequently 
applied as indicators of actor-level autonomy. Behavioural dynamics are empirically studied 
by examining contact patters, cleavages of conflict (along sectorial and/or territorial lines) and 
role perceptions (see below).  
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Departmental behavioural 
dynamics 
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Cleavages of conflict 
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dynamics 
 
Contact patterns 
 
Cleavages of conflict 
 
Role perceptions 
Figure 1: The study of actor-level autonomy, dependant variables. 
A supranational dynamic denotes a shift of loyalty and allegiance towards the IO.  Rosamond 
(2000:204 in Trondal et. al 2010:138) provides a basic definition of supranationalism as “the 
development of authorative institutions of governance and networks of policy-making activity 
above nation-state.” An IO may thus be supranational when it has a “separate identity and 
loyalty and exercises some measure of genuine autonomous power” (Slaughter 2004:22 in 
Trondal et.al 2010:138). Within the field of European Studies, neofunctionalist Ernst B. Haas 
theorized about identity-related concepts in his famous definition of integration: “the process 
whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess 
or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Risse 2005). As noted by Risse, 
the conceptualization of “shifting loyalties” could arguably be understood as a statement 
about collective identity formation. Another of the so-called founding fathers of European 
integration theory, Karl W. Deutsch, also included socialization in his conceptualization of 
European integration by addressing a “sense of community” in his research (Risse 2005). 
International civil servants adopt and internalize values, norms and principles of the 
organization, becoming fully committed to their joint cause. Such a process may essentially 
be fostered through mechanisms of internalization and socialization, i.e. they may be present 
prior to entering a given position or they can appear through transformation and socialization 
processes after entering a position (see next section). In addition to pledged allegiances to the 
overall mission, a supranational behavioural dynamic is characterized by contacts and 
  21 
coordination towards the leadership of the organization and co-operation and conflicts 
between enthusiasts and skeptics within the bureaucracy. It follows that supranational 
behavioural dynamics in this study are expected to externalize themselves first and foremost 
through expressed commitment and allegiances to the WTO mission and the overall 
objectives of the Secretariat.  
 A departmental dynamic builds on the Westminster model viewing the official primarily as 
neutral and loyal to their agency as well as guided by the preferences and concern of their 
units (Trondal et. al 2010:14-15). A departmental behavioural logic is characterized by 
decision-making on the basis of formal rules and regulations in accordance with classic 
Weberian attributes. Officials tend to attach their identity to their units and divisions; their 
loyalty is also directed towards their organization although they primarily perceive themselves 
as representatives of their units. Officials are expected to be “neutral, intelligent, generalist 
professionals who advise ministers” (Richards and Smith 2004:779 in Trondal et. al 
2010:111). A civil servant guided by Weberian virtues of party-political neutrality, attaching 
identities towards their unit are expected to abide to formal rules and procedures of the 
international bureaucracies in which they are employed (Trondal et. al 2010:11). For example, 
previous studies conducted on the Commission (Cini 1997) found that officials within the 
Commission attached role perceptions and identities primarily towards their sub-units rather 
than towards the Commission as a whole. Additionally, it has been argued that departmental 
identities in the Commission are stronger than supranational ones (Trondal et. al 2010:113). 
Provided that the Secretariat shares similar formal traits with the Commission, it does not 
seem unreasonable to assume the disclosure of analogous patterns of behaviour within the 
Secretariat. Moreover, departmental behavioural logics are closely interrelated to horizontal 
specialization as this encourages inward looking orientations by directing focus towards own 
sub-units (see section 2.2.3).  This indicates that specialization along sectorial lines in the 
Secretariat would enhance portfolio allegiances, i.e. departmental behavioural logics would be 
particularly dominating.  
 
Finally, an epistemic dynamic is characterized by professional expertise. It derives from the 
term epistemology, which is a branch of philosophy concerned with the examination of 
knowledge. An epistemic behavioural logic implies that loyalties are expected to be vectored 
towards professional and educational backgrounds. An epistemic dynamic predicts 
professional expertise to be the main factor guiding the decision-making process. Assumably, 
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officials will argue and negotiate on the basis of their professional competences, on which 
they also will legitimize their authority (Trondal et. al 2010:14). Peter Haas viewed epistemic 
communities as a framework for investigation the impact of knowledge and expertise on 
international communities. An inherent trait of the control of knowledge production is the 
capability of articulating “cause and effect relationships and so frame issues for collective 
debate and export their policy projects globally” (Dunlop 2011). Haas theorized about 
epistemic communities in an International Organization (IO) special edition in 1992, where 
he defined epistemic communities as a group of professional that produce policy-relevant 
knowledge about complex technical issues (Haas 1992:16 in Dunlop 2011). Haas argued that 
the inbuilt belief system on an issue contained four knowledge elements:  
 
“ 1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based 
rationale for the social action of community members 2) shared casual belief (…) 
which serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy 
actions and desired outcomes 3) shared notions of validity, that is, intersubjective 
internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of 
their expertise and 4) a common policy enterprise, that is, a set of common practices 
associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, 
presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a 
consequence” (Haas 1992:3 in Dunlop 2011).  
 
Epistemic communities impact on policy outcomes by providing knowledge to policy makers. 
According to Haas, exercising influence is done by “1) elucidating cause-and-effect 
relationships and providing advice on the likely result of various courses of action 2) shedding 
light on complex interlinkages between issues and 3) helping define self-interests of states” 
(Haas 1992 in Dunlop 2011). Another implication of epistemic communities is the fact that by 
recognizing expertise as a form of authority, politicians also accept that this area is off limit 
with regards to intervention, as written by Trondal and others: “epistemic communities (…) 
do not in principle work under the shadow of politicians; they work under the shadow of the 
rules of the scientific community itself” (Trondal et. al 2010:158).   
 
Because horizontal specialization (by purpose) often implies accumulation of expertise, it 
may encourage the development of epistemic communities with shared norms, values and 
understandings. Officials driven by epistemic behavioural logics are often less bound to 
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territorial boarders and particular organizations (Haas 1992 in Trondal et. al 2004:10). 
Translated to this particular study, this implies that horizontal specialization within the 
Secretariat is likely to encourage epistemic behavioural patterns as it unites experts with 
similar educational backgrounds. Moreover, given that epistemic communities in general are 
granted a significant degree of freedom from strong political control, it would be reasonable 
to assume that the experts within the Secretariat are not subjected to strong vertical chains of 
authority.  
 
The proxies outlined below are applied to assess the complexity of international 
bureaucracies. They are summarized in the following table: 
 
A supranational dynamic A departmental dynamic An epistemic dynamic 
  
Loyalty to “the mission and vision” 
of the international organization as a 
whole 
 
Mandated by the leadership of the 
international bureaucracy 
 
Preferences for “the common good” 
 
Contacts and co-ordination with the 
leadership of the international 
bureaucracy 
 
Co-operation and conflict lines 
between “organizational visionaries” 
and “non-visionaries” within the 
bureaucracy 
 
Loyalty towards the international 
bureaucracy and/or their own 
portfolios/dossiers  
 
Mandated by department and unit 
rules  
 
Guided by departmental preferences 
and concerns 
 
Co-operation and conflict follow 
organizational boundaries within the 
bureaucracy 
 
Discipline loyalty 
 
Professional discretion and room for 
manoeuvre 
 
Guided by professional preferences 
and considerations 
 
Contacts with professional experts 
 
Co-operation and conflict follow 
professional boundaries that 
transcend the boarders of the 
bureaucracy 
Figure 2: The Compound Nature of International Bureaucracies (Trondal et. al 2010:15) 
2.2 Explaining Actor-Level Autonomy  
Arguably, certain traits or characteristics of organizational factors will influence behavioural 
patterns and create a systematic bias, making “one process characteristics or outputs more 
likely than others” (Trondal 2014). This is the building block of an organizational approach to 
actor-level autonomy. The assumption is that certain characteristics and aspects embedded 
within the organizational factors will interfere with an actor’s identity and behavioural 
perceptions, inevitably affecting the process and outcome of their work. According to 
Schattschneider (1975:30), “organization is itself a bias in preparation for action”. Formal and 
informal characteristics place guidelines on conduct by systematically classifying, 
simplifying, routinizing and directing attention towards certain aspects rather than others 
(Schattschneider 1975:58).  
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This study applies the following three theoretical propositions to explain the development of 
behavioural dynamics (see below). These are examined by looking at the main proxies: 
educational and professional background, age and gender; length and intensity of service; 
organizational affiliations and specialization.  It is expected that the impact of these variables 
on behavioural dynamics will differ. As outlined below, mechanisms of pre-socialization are 
likely to primarily affect supranational behavioural logics, while mechanisms of re-
socialization are predicted to impact on departmental and epistemic behavioural logics. 
Lastly, effects of organizational affiliations and specialization will presumably be most 
evident in departmental behavioural dynamics.  
 
Independent variables Proxies Predictions
Pre-socialization 
 
a) Educational 
background 
b) Professional 
background 
c) Age 
d) Gender 
 
Will impact primarily on 
supranational behavioural 
dynamics. 
Re-socialization 
 
a) Length and intensity 
of service  
Will impact on departmental 
and epistemic behaviour 
dynamics. 
Organizational affiliation a) Organizational 
specialization 
b) Organizational 
affiliations 
 
Will impact primarily on 
departmental behavioural 
dynamics.  
Figure 3: Independent variables.  
2.2.1 Pre-socialization  
The idea of individual pre-socialization assumes that officials may already have been partly 
exposed to favourable socialization processes prior to entering their position within the 
international bureaucracy (e.g. Hooghe 2012). As argued by the theory of representative 
bureaucracy, demographic attributes may play a crucial role in explaining decision-making 
(Trondal 2010a:79). Individual pre-socialization is an important contributor to this study as 
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most studies of elite socialization often omit to control for the effect of such (Egeberg et. al 
2013).  This study focuses on two main attributes: educational and international background, 
yet also considers age and gender. The effects of organizational demography are closely 
related to socialization, which in turn is a crucial contributor to the development of an 
organizational identity and organizational actorness (Bátora 2011:7).  
 
The theory of representative bureaucracy holds that individual’s backgrounds will shape their 
behaviour and values and subsequently impact on decision-making in organizations (Meier et. 
al 1999, Veggeland and Trondal 2012). For example, in her study on the European 
Commission, Lisbet Hooghe (2012) found that socialization outside the organization appeared 
to be substantially more significant than socialization within the Commission.  The theory of 
representative bureaucracy thus claims that demographic attributes of civil servants may 
prove crucial in understanding government decision-making (Pfeffer 1982, Selden 1997, 
Trondal 2007).  It also presumes that organizations perform better if it is representative of the 
public it serves as it this would make it more inclined to take decisions that benefit the public 
(Meier et. al 1999). Following this chain of reasoning, a bureaucracy will consequently alter 
its performance according to its composition of staff (Veggeland and Trondal 2012:6).  
 
The assumptions made by the theory of representative bureaucracy argue that demographic 
attributes may place guidelines on role perceptions on behaviour. This leads to the prediction 
that highly educated civil servants with international backgrounds and experience are more 
likely to regard themselves as independent sector experts rather than representative for her/his 
nation state (Trondal et. al 2010:32, Cortell and Peterson 2003:6 in Trondal et. al 2004:16). 
According to the institutional perspective, educational backgrounds may influence their 
selection and role perceptions (Selden 1997) and neo-functionalist scholarship suggests that 
epistemic communities of highly educated experts support the evolvement of supranational 
role perceptions (Trondal 2007). Assumably, officials with international education are more 
likely to adopt a supranational mind-set than officials wit national educational backgrounds 
(Trondal et. al 2004:16). Studies demonstrate that educational backgrounds are the most 
important factor in understanding decision-making behaviour within government officials 
(Christensen et. al 2001, Trondal 2006b:17). Both length and type of education is of 
importance.  Due to educational and professional backgrounds it is probable that most of these 
officials have already adopted some degree of a supranational oriented mind-set and thus, are 
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more inclined to view themselves as representatives of the international community rather 
than representatives of nation states (Trondal 2007:10).  
 
With respect to age and gender, it is argued that because younger officials often have not been 
subjected to domestic pre-socialization, they are more inclined to adopt supranational and 
epistemic behavioural patterns than their older peers (Trondal et. al 2010:35).  Furthermore, 
studies conducted on the Commission have suggested that female officials are somewhat less 
supranationally oriented than their male colleagues (Trondal et. al 2014, Kassim et. al 2013 in 
Egeberg et. al 2013). Similar findings may thus be expected in this study of the WTO 
Secretariat.  
2.2.2. Re-socialization 
There is growing support in literature for the claim that pre-socialization on actor’s role 
perceptions are modified by organizational re-socialization (e.g. Checkel 2005, Meier and 
Nigro 1976, Trondal 2007).  At the organizational level, socialization is the process in which 
an organization obtains some sort of common values and meaning. A socialization process at 
the individual level refers to mechanisms through which employees become acclimated to the 
culture of a new workplace. Thus pre-socialization prior to employment may be reinforced or 
altered upon entering the position in the organization (Egeberg et. al 2013:9).  
 
When an organization is institutionalized it has successfully integrated values and objectives 
into the structure and culture of the organization. Institutionalization of an organization may 
involve the infusion of shared norms and values, a particular demographic composition and 
also the building and place associated with the organization. Arguably, in order to be 
characterized as an institution, an organization needs to embody societal values and seek to 
impose these values on society (Selznick 1984). Institutional theory is a theoretical posture 
maintaining that normative pressures arising either from their external or internal 
environment, influence the organization.  New institutionalism or neo-institutionalism is a 
sociological-oriented theory that focuses on how institutions interact and affect society. It 
attempts to explain why institutions emerge in a certain way in a given context. New 
institutionalism assumes that institutions become entrenched in various formal and informal 
organized arrangements, which take on a “life of their own” over time (Bátora 2011:5). New 
institutionalism is frequently applied as a point of departure when exploring socialization and 
learning processes. It abandons the traditional actor-centred approach that builds on rational 
choice and principal-agent theories and merely view IOs as multilateral tools for member 
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states. Rather, it considers IOs to be comprised of a variety of power constellations ranging 
over different levels of governance (Paulsen 2012:7). 
 
The classical definition of socialization is that actors internalize norms and standards of 
behaviour by acting in social structures (Zürn and Checkel 2005). Socialization was a central 
term in the work of Durkheim, who claimed that it did not only represent behaviour, but also 
the rules that govern behaviour and give it meaning (Collin 1997). The term is deeply rooted 
within sociology and psychology; it is used to describe the process by which individuals adopt 
certain norms and standards within a community. The outcome of the socialization process is 
referred to as “internalization” and entails that individuals have established certain values and 
norms that are favourable for a certain group or people. An individual is introduced to norms 
and values and then goes through the process of understanding how and why these norms and 
values are important before finally accepting and adopting the norms as their own viewpoint 
(Scott 1971). This is known as a “socialization-process”.  
 
Socialization and internalization of norms and values are widely applied to explain behaviour 
within organizations and institutions and have thus become of increasing importance to 
scholars within the field of organizational theory. Norms are defined as “a standard of 
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” and place constraints on behaviour and 
choices, making it easier to predict action. It is often a determinant for the outcome of an 
institution (Finnemore and Sikknikk 1998:891 in Davis Cross 2011:3).  Furthermore, 
socialization is closely linked to the concept known as “the logic of appropriateness” (March 
and Olsen 2009). This perspective views human action as driven by rules of appropriate and 
ideal behaviour. March and Olsen write: “actors seek to fulfil their obligations encapsulated in 
a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices 
and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in social collectively, they do what they see as 
appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation” (March and Olsen 2004). Such 
informal, internalized perceptions of what is right/good and legitimate, cause actors to take 
reasoned action by answering three basic questions: What kind of situation is this? What kind 
of person am I? What does a person such as I do in a situation like this? (March and Olsen 
2004:4). Thus, role and identity perceptions become an elementary component of the 
decision-making process. Officials are inclined to take action that they perceive to be in 
accordance with the norms, values and purpose of the organization to which they belong, i.e. 
there is a decision-making bias towards what social norms and values view as the best 
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alternative rather what is considered optimal according to cost-benefit calculations (logic of 
consequences) (Balsiger 2013).  
 
Socialization is widely applied to explain behaviour within organizations and institutions and 
the Commission is often cited as the most prominent case of such. Arguably, shared identities 
will affect both the decision-making process and the outcome, and subsequently also affect 
the future of the global community. Internalization of values and norms are an essential 
contributor to this arising supranational community. The Commission is often used to 
exemplify supranational governance and social learning. Empirical studies have found that 
officials working within this institution get socialized into a collective European mind-set. 
Theories on identity shaping on the supranational level are given additional weight through 
studies demonstrating the ability of European institutions to impact on patterns of conduct 
(Trondal 2007). Numerous Europeanists thus conclude that supranational institutions have 
substantial potential to socialize the individuals working within and it is assumed that similar 
patterns may be observed in comparable international bureaucracies. 
 
A large literature argues that two casual variables are positively related to socialization, 
namely duration and intensity of interaction (e.g. Haas 1958, Checkel 2005). This assumption 
rests on socialization theory affirming a positive correlation between intensity of participation 
with a group and the development of affiliations towards this group as well as an esprit de 
corps (Trondal 2007:12). Informal contact patterns increase the probability that individuals 
will act in accordance with what they perceive to be preferred by the others (Johnston 
2005:1032 in Trondal 2007). Furthermore, loyalty towards the international bureaucracy is 
arguably positively related to length of service (Trondal et. al 2004:17). Social constructivist 
literature also suggests that duration of interaction will enhance socialization potential of 
institutions (Checkel 2005).  Extensive and intensive interaction will amplify internalization 
of norms, rules and interests of the community (Checkel 2005). For example, studies of 
COREPER (Council of Permanent Representatives) and Council Working Parties lend 
support to the claim that there is a positive relationship between intensity of interaction and 
the development of a sense of collectiveness (Lewis 2005, Niemann 2006 in Trondal 
2010a:81).  
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2.2.3 Organizational affiliation 
Contrary to the theory of representative bureaucracy, the Weberian bureaucracy model claims 
that bureaucracies may shape staff through a set of mechanisms, e.g. socialization, discipline 
and control that ensure that tasks are performed relatively independently from the individuals 
(Veggeland and Trondal 2012:6). This model thus implies that officials will act upon roles 
that are shaped by their bureaucracy and that bureaucracies develop their fundamental 
characteristics fairly independent of society.  
 
The organizational perspective emphasizes the organizational context guiding a decision-
maker in seeking tangible solutions to problems. Studies of organizational properties of 
international bureaucracies appear to suggest that similar behaviour dynamics are encouraged 
through organizational characteristics of these bureaucracies. Arguably, behavioural dynamics 
within international bureaucracies is much more a consequence of organizational variables 
than it is a reflection of the international organization in which they are embedded (Trondal 
et. al 2010). An organizational structure defines how activities, responsibilities and tasks are 
allocated and distributed within an organization, thereby also defining interests and goals that 
are to be pursued. Formal organization structures reflect power constellations and provide 
guidelines of behaviour for the individuals working within it. Because actors are likely to 
favour the most satisfactory solution utilizing the possibilities in their immediate 
environment, organizational structures always represents a “mobilization of bias in 
preparation for action” (Egeberg 2012:78).  Hence, organizational structures posses the 
potential to influence the effectiveness of an organization. It is also important to consider the 
actual behaviour, i.e. informal structures, in organizations by studying for example 
organizational communication – and information flows. Exploring formal and informal 
structures will provide a complex picture of an organization and thereby a more resilient 
picture of decision-making (Bátora 2011:6). 
 
Institutional theorists have elaborated on the aforementioned organizational aspect by 
invoking a greater casual role for organizational structures in the socialization process. 
Organizational structure may be a facilitator of conduct and behaviour as it focuses the actors’ 
attentions towards certain solutions and alternatives rather than others.  In 1947, Herbert A. 
Simon coined the term “bounded rationality” denoting the idea that decision-making is 
confined by cognitive and computational limitations prompting decision-makers to apply their 
rationality on simplified choices contra a complete spectrum of all possible alternatives 
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(Simon 1957). Selection mechanisms and filters governing decision-making within an 
organization may be studied by examining the organization structure and its implications on 
behaviour. 
 
The status of primary and secondary affiliations is measured by the length and intensity of the 
affiliation to each of them (Trondal et. al 2010:31) Long and extensive exposure to an 
organization undoubtedly increases the likelihood of developing ownership and commitment 
to an organization, or - as noted by Trondal and others (2010): “these institutions become 
‘real’ in a social psychological sense to the officials.” A distinction should be made between 
length of service in the organization and length of service in a particular unit or division as 
civil servants often tend to work within different units.  
 
Many international servants tend to hold multiple organizational affiliations. A primary 
affiliation is the main engagement of the decision-maker, signifying that this will be the 
structure in which she/he will be primarily occupied with. Part-time involvements, like for 
example membership in committees, are known as secondary affiliations. Advocates of the 
organizational approach claim that such organizational affiliations may have implications on 
how a decision-maker perceives their role (Trondal 2014). Actors are limited by cognitive 
capacities preventing them for evaluating all possible alternatives and consequences, and are 
thus inclined to opt for a satisfactory solution rather than an optimal one (bounded rationality) 
(Egeberg et. al 2013:10) This also implies a reduced capacity to attend more than one 
organizational affiliation at the time. Although it is assumed that the behaviour and role 
perceptions are a result of their primary and secondary affiliations (Trondal et. al 2010:31), 
the logic of primacy suggests that the primary affiliation is likely to affect behaviour more 
extensively than the secondary (Trondal 2014). Thus, following this line of argument, it can 
be expected that officials who primarily are occupied in the WTO Secretariat will have 
directed their identity and role perceptions towards their specialized division. 
 
A typical formal organization contains elements of both horizontal and vertical specialization.  
Organizational specialization “leads to local rationalities and local and routinized learning 
cycles among incumbents” (Olsen 2006 in Trondal 2010:79). It may be grouped into two 
main dimensions: horizontal and vertical differentiation. Horizontal specialization refers to 
the distribution of different tasks; they are grouped into units and tied to concrete positions 
(Christensen et. al 2007:24). It is commonly distinguished between four different principles of 
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horizontal specialization: purpose, process, client and geographical (e.g. Gulick 1937, 
Christensen et. al 2007). The focus of this study are the functional divisions of the WTO 
Secretariat, i.e. specialization by purpose. This is likely to active patterns of co-operation and 
conflict among employees along sectorial lines. Hence, it may be expected that role- and 
identity perceptions are governed by a bureaucratic organization where preferences and 
strategies are targeted towards sectorial objectives, divisions and units (Trondal & Veggeland 
2013). Previous research has shown that “actor’s roles are transformed more easily in highly 
issue-specific situations” (Zürn 2003:20 in Trondal et. al 2004:9).  Stronger degrees of 
horizontal specialization according to purpose and function call for more exclusive 
competences, which in turn ensures a greater degree of discretion and autonomy in 
horizontally specialized organizations (Trondal et. al 2004:9). A second effect of horizontal 
specialization may thus be the emergence of epistemic communities of experts.  
 
This study draws on the assumption that horizontal specialization of international 
bureaucracies catalyses departmental role-perceptions among incumbents, presupposed that 
international bureaucracies represent the primary organizational affiliation of international 
civil servants. It is argued that specialization by purpose will incite patterns of cooperation 
and conflict along sectorial lines (Egeberg 2006 in Trondal 2010) and result in “less than 
adequate” inter-unit and better intra-unit coordination (Ansell 2004:237, Page 1997:10 in 
Trondal 2010b:6). Seen that officials spend most of their time and energy within divisions and 
units, it is expected that they “make affective ties primarily towards their sub-unit and less 
towards the organization as a whole” (Ashford and Johnson 2001:36 in Trondal 2010b:6). If 
the Secretariat is dominated by strong patterns of horizontal specialization, one may thus 
anticipate officials to portray strong departmental logics and orient themselves towards the 
their unit rather than towards the vertical chain of command.  
 
On contrary, hierarchies of command and differentiation characterize a purely vertical 
specialized bureaucracy by degrees of authority. In a vertically specialized organization 
power emanates top down with a clearly defined chain of command.  Vertical specialization 
implies stronger mechanisms for discipline and control through administrative commands and 
individual incentives such as promotion and salary (Egeberg 2012). Studies suggest that 
formal rank is linked to behavioural patterns and role perceptions. Arguably, officials with top 
rank positions are more likely to evoke a logic of hierarchy than officials in lower positions 
(Trondal 2010b:5). Lower rank officials are assumed to be more inclined to adopt a logic of 
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portfolio (Mayntz 1999:84 in Trondal 2010b). It is argued that vertically specialized 
international bureaucracies are likely to have stronger impact on officials’ role perceptions 
and behaviour than less-vertically specialized bureaucracies (e.g. Bennett and Oliver 2002, 
Egeberg 2012, Trondal 2006b). However, the relative administrative capacity within a 
bureaucracy may account for variations in the extent to which officials are guided by a logic 
of hierarchy (Trondal 2010b:5). Provided these theoretical assumptions, one would expect 
role perceptions and behavioural patterns within the Secretariat to be strongly guided by 
vertical principles of organizational structure, yet under the conditions of strong 
administrative capacities at the top level as well as strong vertical chains of command. Weak 
capacities at the top level indicate more variation at the lower levels, and one could expect to 
find that the horizontal dimension will impact more strongly.    
 
Lastly, the actual size of an organization may also entail implications on organizational 
structure, hence behaviour. Size is an important predictor of specialization and formalization 
in that size increases specialization, which in turn leads to lower task uncertainty and 
subsequently more formalization (Donaldson 1999: 96). It is expected that a smaller 
bureaucracy allows for a larger degree of cross-unit and cross-level contact patterns between 
incumbents. Furthermore, a smaller bureaucracy and subsequent closer ties between officials, 
compels the prediction that employees overall will feel affiliated to the bureaucracy as a 
whole.  
2.3 Summing Up 
This study is premised on the assumption that actor-level autonomy may be measured by 
examining supranational, departmental and epistemic behavioural dynamics within a 
bureaucracy. These dynamics are studied by examining contact patterns, cleavages of 
conflicts and role perceptions of officials. Whereas previous research has focused strongly on 
the definition and implications of formal autonomy, this study intends to shed light on the 
underlying causes of de facto autonomy enacted by civil servants. Mechanisms of pre-
socialization, re-socialization and organizational affiliation are expected to impact to various 
degrees on the aforementioned behavioural dynamics. This section outlined the theoretical 
assumptions behind the dependant and the independent variables, and highlighted the ways in 
which the latter interacts and affects the former.    
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine actor-level autonomy within an international 
bureaucracy, namely the WTO Secretariat. It intends to be a contribution to the growing 
literature examining international executives from a PA perspective and builds on previous 
studies that continuously have found clear indications of shifts of identity-perceptions 
amongst civil servants within international bureaucracies.  This chapter presents the 
methodological approach of the study.  
3.1 Research Design 
A research design is a systematic approach to a scientific problem. It outlines the process and 
structure on how one reaches conclusions about relationships in a given dataset. Research 
design and data collection ought to be derived from the main purpose of the study, i.e. the 
research question. Researchers of social sciences commonly ask two types of fundamental 
questions: what is going on (descriptive)? and why is it going on (explanatory)? (Gerring 
2012). This study aspires to assess actor-level autonomy (descriptive) as well as offer 
explanations of such (explanatory).  
 
This study is conducted using a case study paradigm with qualitative method. The notion of 
“case study” is not clearly defined in literature and subsequently it may refer to a variety of 
characteristics (e.g that the research method is qualitative and includes only one or a few 
cases, the research is characterized by process-tracing etc.). Nonetheless, a case study is 
generally defined as intensive studies of a single unit with the aim of generalizing across a 
larger class of similar units (Gerring 2004). A qualitative approach was chosen for this study 
because it enhances the interpretation of social realities as it endorses immeasurable qualities 
such as personal experience and observations. Provided the goal of this study, qualitative 
methods appear to be more suitable as they produce more accurate and detailed information 
compared to numerical results.  
3.2 Case Selection  
This study addresses the research question by conducting an in-depth case study using elite 
interviews and document analysis.  The case under investigation is the WTO Secretariat. The 
purpose of the study is twofold; the aim of the first part is to address actor-level autonomy in 
the WTO Secretariat and the objective of the second part is to explain the emergence of such 
independence. Subsequently, the dependent variable of this study is independence of officials 
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that operate within the Secretariat, whereas the independent variables are factors that may 
explain such independence. The independent variables are studies through the lens of the 
three theoretical propositions presented in chapter 2.  
 
The overall purpose of this study is to analyse and explain the emanation of the empirically 
observed emergence of shared norms and values at the international stage. The role of 
international executives has evolved significantly in the past decades and they have become 
an increasingly active part of the international community. An empirical focus on actor-level 
autonomy is useful for two main reasons. Firstly, potential power within a bureaucracy is 
externalized through individual officials and secondly, institutional transformation, i.e. the 
emergence of relatively independent international bureaucracies, elicits a change in the 
preferences and conceptions of international civil servants (Olsen 2005 in Trondal and 
Veggeland 2013). The vast majority of literature on the emergence of independence among 
international staff has been conducted on the European Union, namely the Commission. 
Because IR scholars traditionally dominated the literature on international organizations, the 
Commission was initially regarded as being sui generis in nature; however, upon the entry of 
PA scholars during the 1990s this claim was questioned and eventually curbed, paving the 
way for comparative studies (e.g. Trondal et. al 2010). This study intends to annex the line of 
previous studies examining international bureaucracies from a PA perspective.  
 
The WTO Secretariat portrays an interesting case not only because it is the administrative 
branch of one of the most powerful international actors, but also due to its organizational and 
institutional features. Studies conducted on similar institutions (e.g Egeberg et al. 2013; 
Trondal et al. 2010) suggest a positive relationship between actor-level autonomy and the 
independent variables outlined in chapter 2. Assumably, analogous mechanisms and outcomes 
are likely to be identified when examining the WTO Secretariat.  
 
Following a wave of extensive research from various scholarships, the Commission has 
manifested itself as a template for independence. Compared to the Secretariat, the 
Commission holds substantially larger capacities for independence; the Secretariat thus falls 
under the category “least-likely” case study. If a theory is to have any application at all, it 
should at the very least be confirmed when applying it to most-likely cases, whereas least-
likely cases are the ‘tough-tests’ in which a given theory is rather unlikely to provide good 
explanation (Bennett and Elman 2010:505 in Willis 2014). Willis (2014) writes: “ Levy 
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(2008) neatly refers to the inferential logic of least-likely cases as the ‘Sinatra inference’ – if a 
theory can make it here, it can make it anywhere.”   
 
A comparative study could have been an alternative for this study; however, the purpose is to 
examine the WTO Secretariat in particular. Moreover, a thorough in-depth evaluation of two 
or more cases against the theoretical background would be difficult due to limitations of time 
and resources.  
3.3 Choice of Method 
Undertaking a single in-depth case study enables the investigation of the behavioural 
dynamics at a more detailed level. There is no clear-cut definition of case study, however, it is 
generally agreed that it may be defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2004:13). This definition captures the 
essence of a case study, namely that – contrary to more generalizing methods – the overall 
objective of case studies is to “provide a level of detail and understanding” (Willis 2014). 
Furthermore, Gerring emphasized that a case study was “intensive study of a single unit for 
the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” where ‘units’ refer to “spatially 
bounded phenomena – e.g. a nation state, revolution, political party, election or person – 
observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time” (Gerring 2004:342). 
Similar definitions can be found in e.g. Seawright and Collier, who defined a case study as “a 
research design focused on one (N=1) or a few cases where cases are defined as ‘the units of 
analysis of a given study’” (Seawright and Collier 2004:275).  
 
The advantage with a single case study is its intensive focus on the case examined (Lijphart 
1971) as such studies desire to obtain a detailed and in-depth understanding of one case. 
Subsequently, the main rationale behind choosing a qualitative case study is the ambition to 
gain in-depth understanding and knowledge on specific phenomena. According to Yin, 
evidence for a case study may come from six sources: documents, archival records, 
interviews, direct observations, participant-observations and physical artefacts (Yin 2004:83).  
3.4 Sources of Data 
All the data used in this study is secondary and previously published. The interviews were 
conducted by Trondal and others and originally applied for comparative research on 
behavioural dynamics within the Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO 
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Secretariat (Unpacking International Organizations – The Dynamics of Compound 
Bureaucracies by Trondal et. al, 2010). All primary data have been made available and re-
analysed for the purpose of this study.  
 
This study draws on the 19 interviews conducted with officials working within the WTO 
Secretariat. All 19 informants belong to trade units; they include 2 top-level directors 
(Deputy-Director Generals), 4 medium levelled officials (Director, Head of Unit) and 13 low 
lever officials (Adviser, Counsellor or equivalent) (Trondal et. al 2010). Data collection took 
place in several stages and in various sequences and was conducted in Geneva during the time 
period 2007-2008. Respondent anonymity is protected by referring to them by interview 
number, e.g. WTO 5, WTO 14 etc. All interviews were fully transcribed. These 19 
transcriptions have been applied to conduct the research in this study.  
 
Moore (2007) points out that a secondary analysis of data should be regarded as a process of 
recontextualizing and restructuring data rather than merely an analysis of pre-existing data. 
Like primary data, secondary data has its pros and cons. A clear benefit of using secondary 
data in this case is access to data that most likely would have been difficult to obtain 
otherwise (the interviews). Additionally, utilizing secondary data often implies that there 
already is an established degree of validity and reliability and it will often be the most 
efficient alternative in terms of time and resources. Disadvantages include possible 
undiscovered biases in the original interviews, lesser degree of control and divergence 
between the interview guide and the research question posed, i.e. the questions are not 
optimized for the given research question.   
 
Semi-structured Interviews 
Contrary to structured interviews; semi-structured interviews are more open and flexible 
allowing the researcher to bring up new questions and thoughts in response to answers and 
comments given by a respondent. The structure is generally organized around an interview 
guide, as is the case with the interviews used in this study. Semi-structured interviews in this 
case present themselves as favourable over structured and unstructured interviews for two 
main reasons: firstly, as already pointed out, the fluid structure allows for further elaboration 
and secondly, the structure ensures incorporation of important theoretical perspectives relating 
to the analytical framework.  
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Given the purpose of this research, interviews with officials are an essential source of data 
seen as this enables the researcher to capture the informal aspects within the bureaucracy. The 
transcriptions reveal important aspects with respect to personal perceptions and beliefs, 
contact patterns and daily operations within the respective units. The interviews thus 
complement the remaining methods and provide important insights that one would have been 
unattainable by the sole use of document analysis.  
 
The personal nature of interviewing is beneficial in many ways, particularly because it allows 
for a dialogue between the interviewer and the informant. For the very same reason however, 
there is a constant danger of introducing errors and bias. Mathers et. al (2002) list four 
possible sources of such: deviations from written instructions (e.g. changing the words of the 
questions), interrogation error (i.e. when questions are phrased differently from one 
respondent to the next, choice of words may affect the answer), interpretation error (related to 
subjective judgements) and finally, recording error (not writing down the answers correctly). 
More often than not, interviews require a certain degree of trust and common understanding 
of the objectives; the relationship between the interviewer and respondent is thus key to 
obtaining a good set of data.  
 
Document Analysis and Secondary Literature 
Public documents and legal texts published by the WTO are often referred to during the 
interviews and serve as the main framework for formal rules and procedures. These have also 
been applied to contextualize the institutional and organizational environment within the 
Secretariat as well as providing background information about the case under investigation.  
 
Document analysis is a frequently applied technique in qualitative methods. It involves 
examining and interpreting the data in order to “elicit meaning, gain understanding and 
develop empirical knowledge”  (Corbin and Strauss 2008 in Bowen 2009). A qualitative 
researcher is expected to draw on multiple sources (at least two), and generally, document 
analysis is applied as a complementary method to other research methods (Bowen 2009).   
Atkinson and Coffey urge researchers to carefully evaluate the explanatory value of 
documents for a specific research purpose: “…We should not use documentary sources as 
surrogates for other kinds of data. We cannot, for instance, learn through records alone how 
an organization actually operates day-by-day. Equally we cannot treat records – however 
‘official’ – as firm evidence of what they report (…) That strong reservation does not mean 
  38 
that we should ignore or downgrade documentary data. On contrary, our recognition of their 
existence as social facts alerts us to the necessity to treat them very seriously indeed. We have 
to approach them for what they are and for what they are used to accomplish” (Atkinson and 
Coffey 1997:47 in Bowen 2009).   
 
Relevant to this study, is first and foremost that document analysis provides valuable 
background and context, as well as supplementary data. This entails both advantages and 
limitations. On the plus side, amongst others, is the fact that documents are often easily 
accessed, as many of them are public and/or obtainable online. As Bowen puts it: “…An 
maxim to keep in mind is that if a public event happened, some official record of it most 
likely exists” (Bowen 2009). This study draws on official WTO legal texts and reports, which 
primarily have proven useful in asserting the formal framework, i.e. formal constraints and 
allowances placed upon officials operating within the Secretariat. This in turn, contributes to 
provide an overview of the organizational background required to draw conclusions on the 
dependant and independent variable.  
 
Document analysis is consequently an attractive and efficient tool for qualitative researchers. 
Another advantage is the fact that documents are ‘unobtrusive and ‘non-reactive’ meaning 
that they are unaffected by research and/or the researcher. Other advantages include exactness 
(names, references, details) and broad coverage (many settings, events, long time periods) 
(Yin 1994 in Bowen 2009). The abovementioned features are both relevant and beneficial 
with respect to this particular research. On the downside, applying written sources to a study 
may often imply a ‘selectivity bias’. As noted by Bowen (2009): “ … In an organizational 
context, the available (selected) documents are likely to be aligned with corporate policies and 
procedures and the agenda of the organization’s principles (…)” Thus, one should always 
bear in mind the objective and agenda of the source. This is closely linked to the notion of 
source critique. In addition to being aware of underlying motivations of the source, one 
should also be critical in selecting documentation given that there is always the possibility of 
obtaining unreliable material. In this particular study, the documents originate from the WTO. 
Legal texts are fairly straight forward as they reflect the legal mandates in their current and 
official form. There is always a danger with official reports, however, that they may be biased 
or flawed by inaccurate use of statistics or methodology.  
 
  39 
Secondary literature refers to previous studies have analysed the current variables under 
investigation. In such cases, there is nearly always an underlying threat of misinterpreting 
foregoing research and analysis, which in turn endangers the validity of the study. 
Nonetheless, as in this case, previous studies may often serve as a point of departure and offer 
important analytical insights and information facilitating ongoing research.   
3.5 Evaluation and Methodological Challenges 
Validity and reliability is a reoccurring concern in virtually all research within social sciences. 
Validity refers to the success (or failure) of measuring what the researcher set out to measure, 
whereas reliability is concerned with the extent to which the results are verifiable, i.e. if a 
measuring procedure will yield the same data if repeated. 
 
Validity thus largely relates to the operationalization of variables. Construct validity entails 
identifying the correct operational measures for the concepts being studied, whereas strong 
internal validity implies that there are reliable measurements of dependant and independent 
variables, as well as strong justification for linking these two. Given that this study builds on 
previous research, which largely affirms the explanatory values of the indicators utilized in 
this study (cf. Trondal et. al 2010, Egeberg et. al 2013), the overall validity in regards to 
operationalization and causality is found to be at a good level. However, a note of caution 
should be added as it is generally difficult to draw direct links between empirical observations 
and outcomes when undertaking qualitative case studies.  External validity in this case refers 
to the ability to generalize the study to other institutions. A common weakness of case studies 
is fairly low possibilities to make generalizations. This study may not be generalized directly 
onto similar institutions, however, given that previous studies suggest that parallel 
mechanisms may be detected in similar institutions, the empirical observations on this study 
may provide important indicators for possible findings within similar institutions.    
 
Reliability refers to the extent to which it is possible to replicate this study and thereby obtain 
the same results (Yin 2004). Whereas the written sources (documents) are public and 
available online, the interviews are difficult to replicate first and foremost due to the 
anonymity of respondents. Written sources may often result in excess information and 
difficulties in identifying relevant information. Another challenge may be the reliability of the 
documents; it is thus crucial that the researcher evaluates the material carefully. Documents 
and secondary literature that have been used in this study emanate from reliable sources and 
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have all been selected in response to the research question posed. The validity of written 
sources is thus found to be at a good level. Furthermore, elite interviews may generally pose a 
challenge to reliability. Though personal biases are not thought to be an excessive problem 
(Berry 2002), the presence of a researcher may influence a situation and the respondents may, 
for example, downplay or exaggerate their roles or beliefs. Though despite the drawbacks, 
there are enormous benefits in interviewing elites. This primarily relates to their function as 
exclusive sources of first-hand knowledge and insights into international bureaucracies that 
could not have been obtained otherwise.  
 
Furthermore, the discussion and subsequent conclusions drawn in this study are to a large 
extent based on written sources, and reliability will thus relate to personal interpretations and 
presentation of the empirical material available. It is thus possible that results will vary from 
researcher to researcher depending upon emphasis placed on statements and how these 
statements are interpreted. Overall the reliability of this study is seen as being at a satisfactory 
level. 
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4. Empirical Inquiry 
 
This chapter provides a detailed account of the findings from the interviews and documents 
described in the previous chapter. As outlined, the data was collected and processed using 
qualitative techniques. The objective is to identify characteristics associated with the 
dependant variable discussed in chapter 2, namely actor-level autonomy, which is done along 
the lines of three behavioural dynamics arguably responsible for inciting the process of 
collective identity formation at the international level. The chapter is structured as follows: 
firstly, it provides a general overview of the WTO, followed by a comprehensive description 
of the Secretariat. Secondly, it proceeds to outline the findings related to patterns of 
behaviour.   
4.1 The World Trade Organization  
The WTO was formally inaugurated on January 1st 1995 under the Marrakesh Agreement as a 
successor to GATT, which commenced in 1948. It marked a significant advance in 
multilateralism, aspiring to be a pragmatic and result-oriented international organization 
setting new standards to international economic cooperation. While GATT had been 
functioning well according to its intentions and purpose, the developments on the global 
trading system called for a more comprehensive and broad trade organization. The WTO was 
thus established covering a wider range of practical and functional areas, amongst others it 
now covered trade in services and trade-related aspects on intellectual property as well, contra 
to trade of merchandise goods only as was the case under GATT rules. Additionally, there 
was also a desire to create a permanent organization with institutional and symbolic value that 
would strike roots on the international stage. In contrast to the WTO, which was to become an 
institutional body, GATT was merely a set of multilateral agreements agreed upon by nation 
states, thus lacking the desired institutional manifestation.  The creation of the WTO was 
consequently the primary objective of the GATT Uruguay Round Negotiations, which were 
held between 1986 and 1994 (e.g. Trondal et. al 2010, Fergusson 2007, Xu and Weller 2004, 
WTO 2014). 
 
”The World Trade Organization (WTO) deals with the global rules of trade between nations. 
Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.” 
(WTO 2014a) The main objectives of the WTO are thus supervision and liberalization of 
international trade. There are currently 160 member states and 24 observer governments, 
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additionally; the European Union is also a member. Since its launch, WTO members have 
continuously stressed their commitment to making the organization universal in scope and 
coverage and as of 2007, the WTO member states represented 96.4% of global trade and 
96.7% of global GDP, using 2005 data (WTO 2014a). While it may take credit for several 
remarkable advancements and milestones of international trade, the growing number of 
member states, the complexity of its mission as well as the changing international economic 
environment, entails a series of significant challenges in finding tangible solutions and 
compromises as well as ensuring compliance among member states with rules and 
agreements. Additionally, the WTO role as a promoter of free trade has been very 
controversial and subjected to heavy criticism. Amongst others, it has been seen as being 
hijacked by richer countries, resulting in policies that only widen the global inequality gap - 
making the rich even richer at the expense of the poor. 
 
The highest authority within the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, composed of 
representatives from each member. The MC is to meet at least once every two years to make 
decisions on all matters under the multilateral WTO Agreements. From 1996 to 2013 there 
have been 9 conferences. The daily function of the WTO is carried out by the General 
Council, which represents the second level of the decision-making structure within the 
organization. The General Council consist of three bodies; the General Council, The Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) and The Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB). It acts on behalf of the 
MC and is composed of ambassadors and permanent representatives from the WTO members. 
Thirdly, there are three subsidiary bodies reporting to the General Council: Council for Trade 
in Goods (Goods Council), Council for Trade in Service (GATS Council) and Council for 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Council). These comprise the 
apparatus for the General Council and have numerous subsidiary committees, which make up 
the fourth level of the WTO. The abovementioned levels may be seen as being the political 
level of the WTO as they are comprised of, and overseen by, the member states. On the other 
hand, the WTO Secretariat represents the administrative level of the WTO. Though arguably, 
given the economic and legal competences the head of the WTO Secretariat, the Director-
General, also holds a political position in addition the administrative function (Trondal et. al 
2010:91). 
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4.2 The WTO Secretariat 
The WTO Secretariat is located in Geneva and headed by the Director-General. The Director-
General is appointed by the WTO members for a four-year term and is responsible for 
overseeing the administrative functions of the WTO. Furthermore, there are four Deputy-
Directors General (DDGs) fulfilling supportive roles and forming the senior management of 
the WTO Secretariat together with the Director-General (Van den Bossche and Zdouc 
2013:136). The Secretariat holds a central position as guardian of treaties in addition to its 
official function as the administrative branch of the WTO. It employs around 600 staff 
members and has an annual budget of approximately 160 million Swiss Francs (Trondal et. al 
2010:92). There are over 60 nations represented in the WTO Secretariat, the majority of 
which have either a legal or economic educational background and originate from developed 
countries; particularly France, United Kingdom, Spain, Switzerland and the United States are 
heavily represented. The number of staff from developing countries is increasing, yet remains 
a clear minority, thus a point of concern for many (Van den Bossche and Zdouc 2013:137).  
 
With a size equivalent to that of the DG Trade of the Commission, the WTO Secretariat is a 
fairly small bureaucracy. Theoretically, one implication of a small-scaled bureaucracy is more 
limited capacity to act relatively independent from member-states compared to larger 
bureaucracies (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009 in Trondal 2010b), however this claim has 
been challenged by comparative studies on international bureaucracies, which largely 
concluded that “the size of international bureaucracy is not a key explanation of variation in 
behavioural logics of international civil servants” (Trondal 2010b:3) The structural 
composition of the Secretariat follows a portfolio logic among staff and is strongly 
horizontally organized into divisions with functional, information and liaison and support 
roles (Trondal et. al 2010). Divisions come directly under the DG or a DDG. As of 2008, 
there were 16 functional divisions (see below). Additionally, there was a separate secretariat 
to assist the WTO Appellate Body in dispute settlement. 
 
• Accession Division 
• Agriculture and Commodities Division 
• Council and Trade Negotiations Committee Division 
• Development Division 
• Doha Development Agenda Special Duties Division 
• Economic Research and Statistics Division 
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• Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation 
• Intellectual Property Division 
• Legal Affairs Division 
• Market Access Division 
• Rules Division 
• Technical Cooperation and Audit Division 
• Trade and Environment Division 
• Trade and Finance and Trade Facilitation Division 
• Trade in Services Division 
• Trade Policies Review Division 
 
The divisions fulfil a pivotal role in ensuring that activities within their respective fields are 
conducted in accordance with existing agreements. Their work also includes arranging 
meetings for members and writing papers to facilitate the review process of implementation of 
WTO rules. According to the WTO the role of the Secretariat includes: 
 
“Its main duties are to supply technical and professional support for the various 
councils and committees, to provide technical assistance for developing countries, to 
monitor and analyse developments in world trade, to provide information to the public 
and the media and to organize the ministerial conferences. The Secretariat also 
provides some forms of legal assistance in dispute settlement process and advises 
governments wishing to become Members of the WTO.” (WTO 2010) 
 
Put more figuratively by one of the respondents: 
 
 “It’s the conductor of an orchestra” (WTO 9).  
 
The Secretariat is a small bureaucracy, yet handles a substantial amount of work. It has “few 
formal powers and resources, but (…) nevertheless has the potential to make a difference in 
the operations of the WTO” (Trondal et. al 2010:106). Or, as one respondent said:  
 
“It is a small Secretariat, and it is a very informal and empowered Secretariat.”  
(WTO 5) 
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As predicted by organizational theory, horizontal specialization tends to encourage patterns of 
co-operation and conflict among officials within the same units (intra) rather than across units 
(inter). The Secretariat is also organized according to a vertical (a number of hierarchical 
positions) principle where the Director-General holds the top position. A Cabinet consisting 
of officials primarily from the Secretariats divisions supports the Director-General, a position 
currently held by Roberto Azevedo, who succeeded Pascal Lamy in September 2013. At the 
next level are the DDGs followed by a number of specialized divisions, usually headed by a 
Director who reports to the DDG or the Director-General. The Economic Affairs Officer and 
the Counsellor are the two main positions below the Director, although formally, there is no 
hierarchy within the Divisions (Trondal et. al 2010:94-95, WTO 2014e).  
 
 
Figure 4: Hierarchical structure of the WTO Secretariat 
 
Respondents generally report frequent contact patterns within units and to their immediate 
superiors and relatively limited interaction across units and levels. The civil servants receive 
little direct instructions and commonly find that they enjoy a fair bit of flexibility in their 
daily work and functions. The administrative capacities are relatively weak and there are no 
clear indications of strong hierarchical steering mechanisms. Overall, the specialized structure 
is stronger reflected that the vertical hierarchy.  
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The legal basis for the Secretariat is regulated on the basis of Article VI of the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization. While it does clearly state that the Secretariat and 
the Director-General are to be neutral and “not seek or accept instructions from any other 
government or any other authority external to the WTO” (WTO 2014b) it does not clearly 
specify their duties or powers. The WTO Secretariat and the Director-General are 
subsequently formally considered to be executing a purely administrative function, which is 
merely supportive and technical in nature i.e. neither exercises any form of independent 
decision-making powers, nor do they have any formal right of initiative. The Secretariat 
serves as the “institutional memory” of the WTO and provides expertise on WTO issues and 
rules (Trondal et. al 2010:92) - it is involved in the majority of ongoing work and functions of 
the WTO.  
 
The actual day-to-day operation of the Secretariat, however, calls the aforementioned “purely 
administrative” role into question as it - informally - is involved in launching initiatives, 
submitting proposals and advising member states on trade matters (Footer 2006). Situated at 
the core of the complex and capacious international stage, civil servants constantly find 
themselves juggling a multidimensional set of interests, values and cleavages of conflict. With 
an increasingly compound bureaucracy comes a diversified and extensive workload. The 
Secretariat is a fairly small bureaucracy responsible for executing core functions of the WTO. 
Although it is intended to fulfil a purely administrative role, the Secretariat seems to gradually 
take on a more political role as well, as it is constantly being given more responsibilities and 
tasks from the member states. Simultaneously, one consequence of such developments 
appears to be increased bureaucratization with more formalized procedures and increased 
transparency, and in this sense it is comparable to national administrations. There is an 
important distinction, however, in that the officials within the Secretariat have more flexible 
and shifting tasks and assignments. Additionally, organizational traits allow for more 
freedom. When asked about the differences between working in the Secretariat contra to 
national government, one official said: 
 
“There are several. One that is the WTO Secretariat is a much smaller bureaucracy 
(…), which provides for more flexibility and autonomy in our work.” (WTO 15) 
 
More often than not the respondent indicate that they do have some degree of leeway in 
performing their duties and tasks. Moreover, some respondents imply that this also applies 
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when advising on certain issues, though they are careful to underline their subjectivity when 
doing so. 
 
“I can give my own opinion, but I try to still keep it neutral. I just say, ‘this is my own 
personal opinion on how I think it would work best.” (WTO 8) 
 
A significant increase in size as well as expansion of scope and function has provided the 
Secretariat with opportunities to take on a more independent role (Xu and Weller 2004:268), 
e.g. a study conducted on the Secretariats influence on Trade-Environment Policies concluded 
that the WTO Secretariat is not merely a passive bureaucracy, but an active participant in 
shaping trade-environment issues, primarily by utilizing various sources of bureaucratic 
autonomy to influence how trade-environment issues are framed and discussed (Jinnah 2010). 
Xu and Weller write: “the notion of a member-driven organization does not preclude 
Secretariat influence, but shapes it” arguing that the member-states to some extent even 
depend on the Secretariats guidance and responsibilities (Xu and Weller 2004:266-267).  
 
Influence may be exerted through various channels. The interviews indicate that close ties to 
the Chair are a possible gateway to influence on particular issues. Furthermore, advising 
delegations and drafting proposals also provide the civil servants considerable clout to shape 
the ways in which issues are defined and addressed. The notion of “invisible governance” 
(Mathiason 2007) is frequently applied to conceptualize the extent that international 
secretariats unseenly shape and influence global politics and policies. Abbott et al. (2012) 
coined the term “orchestration” delineating a new mode of governance in which IOs may 
enlist intermediaries through which they can shape and influence global governance without 
employing hard instruments. In the context of the WTO, one may differentiate between 
individual orchestration in a narrow sense, i.e. the Secretariat, and collective orchestration by 
the organization as a whole (Elsig 2013). Arguably, such individual orchestration by the 
Secretariat is mainly materialized through the “DGs ‘convening power’ and the possibility to 
grant to intermediaries access to specific information (and to provide behind-the-door 
counsel) supplied by the WTO staff” (Elsig 2013). Yet at the same time, the danger of 
developing too close ties to private actors (and member states), thereby endangering perceived 
neutrality, is repeatedly stressed by the informants.  
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Despite constraints placed upon it through formal structure and legal framework, legal and 
economic competences provide the Secretariat with important tools for influencing and 
affecting agenda, process and outcomes. While formally, the Secretariat is a neutral and rule-
driven bureaucracy, informally the potential to influence and shape policies is arguably 
present, though there appears to be some disagreement regarding the de facto power of the 
Secretariat amongst the respondents. While some claim that there is a significant room for 
influence, others renounce this claim arguing that the inbuilt limitations of the Secretariat 
ensure neutrality and subordination.  Though in general, the majority appear prone to the 
possibilities of exercising some form of influence. 
 
“I think the Secretariat has a hugely unrecognized influence, because in almost 
everything the WTO membership does, the Secretariat is generating the 
analysis, drafting the documents…So to the extent that we introduce the ideas, 
we shape existing ideas. So we influence, but it is totally invisible, because it 
goes out as a committee report or a member tables a paper or a dispute case 
report of a panel. My perspective is that the Secretariat has quite a bit of 
influence, but is also probably not fully using the influence (…)” (WTO 6) 
 
“  (…) the question of WTO first being a member driven organization, and then 
the role of the Secretariat in that member driven organization, which tends to 
be a little bit less than people from the outside believe it is. The possibilities for 
the Secretariat to move issues, it is limited.” (WTO 4) 
 
Assuming there is substantial room for shaping policies, it clearly needs to be conducted in a 
subtle and unobtrusive manner. Because member states ultimately have the power to “make or 
break” individuals, divisions and the Secretariat in general, one needs to be careful not to step 
on any toes. Officials are well aware of the restrictions and limitations placed upon them by 
the organizational framework, but do not all dismiss the possibility of pulling some strings in 
the shadows of the official power constellation.  
 
“(…) Knowledge is power. And sometimes you can very well help to shape the 
thinking of people about what’s a good solution and what’s a bad solution. But you 
have to do that more indirectly than directly. You know, you can’t just sort of say, I’m 
in charge here, so you have to do it my way. You have to help shape their thinking and 
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influence. You very often find people, if you talk to people in the delegations who will 
say, you know, so-and-so in the Secretariat staff is one of my mentors, I’ve learned a 
great deal from this person.” (WTO 18) 
 
“(…) I think I sort of walk the line between being a WTO representative and needing 
to be impartial and not appear to be biased in any way (…) But then at the same time I 
have to have some kind of the researcher side. I think I tend more towards being open 
in the debate and discussion (…)” (WTO 6) 
 
One official even implies that it is virtually expected that the Secretariat presumes some kind 
of influential role.  
 
“…But you do want a Secretariat that is moving things forward through it’s own 
initiative, otherwise, what are we doing? But it should never look like the Secretariat is 
doing it. I think that is important, and I think that we are not so bad at that.” (WTO 12) 
 
The formal processes in the Secretariat are supplemented by a considerable degree of informal 
contacts between various actors such as staff members, national delegations and member 
states. It may be worth remarking that contact patterns, be it formal or informal, may run more 
freely given the fairly small size of the Secretariat.  
 
“Because the members are very touchy about intervention from the Secretariat, unless 
they take us informally and say, you know, can you think of something which can 
work this out. We may have an idea, and we can share it with them. One has to 
distinguish between the formal process and the informal process.” (WTO 14) 
 
Trondal et. al (2010:100) conclude “the WTO Secretariat can thus take on a number of 
functions and roles in the WTO – some formal, others informal. The WTO is clearly a 
member-driven organization and the WTO Secretariat officially has no influence on the WTO 
decision-making (…) However, in practice, there is room for the Secretariat to make a 
difference”. Such observations constitute the foundation of the assumption that international 
bureaucracies, like the WTO Secretariat, are capable of altering and shaping the outcome of 
world politics.  Assumably, as explained in chapter 1, the potential to do so, is largely a 
consequence of the development of a supranational-oriented mind-set, i.e. emergence of 
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shared identities, norms and values within a bureaucracy. To sum up, there is substantial 
evidence corroborating the notion that WTO Secretariat - through its expert knowledge, 
institutional memory and central position within the organization - entails significant potential 
for “invisible governance.”  
4.3 Behavioural Dynamics within the WTO Secretariat  
Global order transformation includes the formation of a collective identity among civil 
servants operating within the frames of international bureaucracies and organizations. The 
Secretariat evokes and combines a multidimensional set of representational roles and 
behavioural dynamics amongst its officials. These behaviours are both reciprocal and 
concurrent, and encourage the development of autonomous attitudes and ideologies. As 
outlined in chapter 2, supranational, departmental and epistemic behavioural dynamics are 
frequently applied as indicators of actor-level autonomy. Several of the respondents indicate 
that the roles they assume are dependant upon situation and circumstance. 
 
“It depends on where I’m going and what I’m asked. There are times where one is 
clearly going as the WTO representative, you may be focusing on a particular area but 
you’re identity is going to be as the WTO representative primarily. There are times 
when I or some of my colleges are asked to participate in expert consultations where 
clearly we are there as an expert in a particular field. It varies (…)” (WTO 15) 
 
“Well, it’s a mix of WTO representative and the expertise that is under discussion, 
let’s say. It’s a mix of both (…)” (WTO 11)  
 
These quotes illustrate that the multidimensional work environment activates various 
behavioural logics. Officials in the Secretariat often find themselves balancing various roles, 
identities and commitments. The civil servants regard themselves as being WTO 
representatives; yet do also frequently accentuate roles related to portfolio or expertise. This 
next section looks at the three behavioural dynamics that arguably invigorate supranational 
identity formation.  
4.3.1 Supranational dynamics 
Civil servants in the Secretariat are committed to their cause. Several of the respondents view 
commitment and belief to be a precondition for working in the Secretariat. They perceive 
themselves as being part of a larger, global network and align their beliefs and values 
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accordingly. The interviews confirm that WTO officials commonly also feel a deeper and 
more personal affiliation towards the global cause.  
 
“(…) In terms of work, you are not here for the money, but you believe in what you 
doing. You work for an institution, which you believe is instrumental in contributing 
to the global effort to reduce poverty worldwide. It is the believe that extracts you to 
the job, so it’s not about the money”  (WTO 3) 
 
“(…) It’s narrow-minded in the sense that you work for a national or European 
interest, and here you work for a global, public good so to speak.” (WTO 2) 
 
A certain degree of endorsement towards the overall objectives of the WTO as a whole is 
often emphasized. Though identities often are directed towards sub-units, the importance of 
an elementary belief in the mission is regarded as a prerequisite.  
 
“(…) In a way you are a part of a division, but obviously you shouldn’t loose sight of 
the fact that you are working for an organization where you can’t decide and can be in 
another division tomorrow (…) I think we have to be committed to what the WTO is 
an institution, which basically is for trade liberalization, so clearly you have to believe 
in that.” (WTO 3) 
 
“I think that one thing that is true for the Secretariat is that the people who are here 
believe in what the role of the WTO is, and what the role of international trade in 
development is also (…) I think that is something you get throughout the house.” 
(WTO 4) 
 
The Secretariat generally employs officials on a permanent basis. Subsequently, the 
Secretariat more often than not represents the primary organizational affiliation. The majority 
of respondents have little professional ties to their respective governments, some also report 
having limited emotional attachments towards it. A few of the respondents have secondary 
affiliations to teaching and education. As already established, the prevailing perspective of 
own identity is as an international civil servant, with little to no responsibilities or 
commitments towards their nation states.  Nationalities are thus of little importance and play a 
  52 
rather insignificant role. The respondents devote little attention to national backgrounds and 
commonly take on more global and neutral identities. 
 
“ (…) but here I don’t feel like I am an American working in the WTO. I don’t feel 
any attachment to the US government more or less, support their position or anything, 
I feel completely neutral. Actually, I have more contact with developing countries 
now, and the countries where I used to work.” (WTO 8) 
 
“They (national government) know that my interests here are to preserve the 
organization.” (WTO 9) 
 
Supranational behavioural logics may already be rooted in officials before they enter the IO, 
primarily through consistent exposure to conditions that foster loyalty and conviction towards 
the international community.  The composition of staff as well as recruitment procedures may 
provide indications of what kind of behavioural logics may be expected.  As pointed out 
previously, a large proportion of officials within the WTO Secretariat share similar 
educational backgrounds and many of the officials have specialized in international trade 
policy. Recruitment of personnel to the Secretariat is based on merit only; although age is of 
less importance, some experience is required. The majority of staff thus possesses experience 
relating to trade policy and international trade relations from national governments, 
international organizations and other organizations. Many of the respondents also report 
having studied or worked abroad prior to entering their position at the Secretariat. The 
respondents generally have at least a few years of work experience within domestic 
governments, private sector and/or international organizations, only two of the entered their 
positions more or less directly after their studies. There is no distinct career path leading to a 
position in the Secretariat. The professional backgrounds are highly diversified; yet do share 
one common feature in that virtually all have had positions in which they have dealt with 
international questions. Often these questions have been trade-related and involved different 
global players such as private companies, international organizations or national governments. 
Some of the respondents first made acquaintance with GATT/WTO through their previous 
positions.  
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Whereas some respondents had acquired their positions by chance, others more determinately 
pursued a career within the WTO. The main incentives for seeking employment in the 
Secretariat is the opportunity to work for an international organization that advocates policies 
to which the officials are personally committed to, and also the opportunity to be a part of a 
highly respected community of experts and researchers (see section 4.3.3.)  
 
“Because I wanted to come here. I was working in the private sector and I had started 
a little sort of society intellectual academic society, society on international economic 
global had a little conference journal. And I wanted to do more GATT/WTO (…) The 
legal division already had a fascinating role of advising, and I wanted to do that. It was 
my dreams, I studied, and it worked.”  (WTO 5) 
 
“(…) since I was at the university the idea of going to work outside and inside an 
international organization, I thought it was a good idea to research, to be in an 
international environment with people from all over the world (…) (WTO 17) 
 
Officially, there are no national quotas and recruitment is based on merit only, but it is 
implied that the Secretariat does attempt to ensure a balanced composition of staff.  Overall, 
the respondents reflect the general distribution of nationalities with an underrepresentation of 
officials from less developed countries, and a slight overrepresentation of officials from the 
US and France. When asked about nationality as a factor of recruitment, many of the 
respondents state that countries of origin play a fairly insignificant role. 
 
 “Q: (…) Is nationality a factor in the work or in the recruitment? 
A: In the recruitment, no, although I am not 100% sure. Officially not, and I have 
recruited a number of people in this division and, and it has never been a criterion, 
never.” (WTO 2) 
 
An important observation relating to the demographic profile is the fact that the WTO 
Secretariat appears to have relatively many employees with long tenure. The Secretariat is 
inclined to employ staff on a more permanent basis. Figures presented in the study undertaken 
by Trondal et. al (2010) reveal that 5-15 years of employment is the most common tenure 
among Secretariat staff, there is also a striking proportion of personnel with 15-25 years of 
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service. Furthermore, the figures also show that the proportion of staff with more than five 
years of employment actually increased between 2000 and 2007.  
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Figure 5: Distribution of years of service of WTO staff 2007-2007 (percentage of staff) (Trondal et. al 
2010:104). 
 
On average, the respondents have been working within the Secretariat approximately 13-14 
years and around 5-6 years on their current portfolio. Two had been employed by the WTO 
for more than 30 years, whereas the newest staff addition amongst the respondents joined the 
Secretariat 3 years ago. Most of them have been involved in various aspects of they day-to-
day functioning of the Secretariat. It may be worth pointing out that long tenure is a key 
element in theory of socialization. It is thus reasonable to assume that there is substantial 
socialization potential within the Secretariat given that these figures show that there is a 
significant amount of personnel with secular exposure to WTO’s culture, norms and social 
pressures (Trondal et. al 2010:104). 
 
Geneva is home to a variety of international organizations active in fields ranging from 
humanitarian aid to trade to sustainable development. It has become the European centre of 
international governance with an international sector that engages more than 28 000 
employees (Graduate Institute Geneva 2014). Geneva has consequently become a vibrant 
multicultural city and a major international crossroad for numerous international civil 
servants. Not unexpectedly, respondents report cultivating contacts to this international 
community outside the office as well. While some build personal friendships with their work 
colleges through social or private events, others maintain ties to the international circle though 
family commitments and other long-term personal relationships. Overall, social interactions 
outside the office are diversified yet international in character.  
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4.3.2 Departmental dynamics 
Departmental behavioural dynamics are characterized by a loyalty towards portfolio and 
divisions in addition to a general loyalty to the organization as a whole. Specialized divisions 
are arguably the fundament of the Secretariat as these are responsible for executing the vast 
majority of tasks and assignments. Such horizontal specialization often elicits inward looking 
behavioural patterns where the civil servant regards him-or herself as being “neutral, 
intelligent, generalist professionals who advise ministers” (Richards and Smith 2004:779 in 
Trondal et. al 2010:111). Such views are confirmed throughout the interviews. The 
Secretariats function as advisor to the member states is repeatedly stressed and many of the 
respondents perceive themselves as neutral experts whose task is to support the member 
states, or as one respondent put it:  
 
“We are the guardians of the book.” (WTO 9) 
 
A specialized organizational structure encourages frequent contact-patterns and interaction 
within divisions. Respondents generally report that the bulk of interaction takes place within 
their sub-units and that they frequently communicate with colleagues within the same 
division. It is a common observation that horizontal specialization is a key element in 
fostering portfolio identities. Officials within the Secretariat express a strong sense of loyalty 
towards their divisions, though identities and role perceptions are also directed towards the 
WTO Secretariat and the WTO as a whole. Arguably, strong sub-unit identities may to some 
degree be the premises for the development of identities towards the subsequent levels within 
an organization (Trondal 2010). The Secretariats’ dependency upon smoothly functioning 
sub-units is regularly implied and acknowledged by the respondents. The Secretariat is not a 
strongly vertically specialized bureaucracy although there is a noticeable formal hierarchy. 
Information flow typically runs through the division director and then up. When vertical 
contact patterns occur, it is usually between consecutive subordinates, rarely overlapping 
levels of authority. The relatively weak administrative capacities on the top level allows for a 
more flexible and adjustable structure at the lower levels.   
 
Article VI of the Agreement establishing the WTO clearly states that the Secretariat is to be 
neutral and independent for member states: 
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”4. The responsibilities of the Director-General and of the staff of the Secretariat shall 
be exclusively international in character. In the discharge of their duties, the Director-
General and the staff of the Secretariat shall not seek or accept instructions from any 
government or any other authority external to the WTO. They shall refrain from any 
action which might adversely reflect on their position as international officials. The 
Members of the WTO shall respect the international character of the responsibilities of 
the Director-General and of the staff of the Secretariat and shall not seek to influence 
them in the discharge of their duties” (WTO 2014b). 
 
It follows that officials within the Secretariat must maintain allegiance towards the WTO as a 
whole and be committed to serving the organization rather than their respective nation states. 
The WTO Staff regulations state: 
 
“Staff members shall discharge their duties with the interest and objectives of the 
WTO in view and, in so doing, shall be subject to the authority of, and responsible to, 
the Director-General” (WTO 1995).  
 
The respondents repeatedly emphasize the importance of being perceived as an independent 
and neutral wing of the organization. Loyalty and affiliations towards divisions are repeatedly 
implied throughout the interviews. Attachment to units are expressed in various forms, 
primarily by declared devotion towards specific issues related to their dossier, but also by 
highlighting relationship to colleges and an overall sense of belonging to their units. Many of 
the officials feel that there is a team spirit within their divisions. It is also noteworthy that 
many of the respondents elaborate thoroughly on the missions, tasks and procedures of their 
portfolios. Though this is clearly not unexpected, it does further underline personal 
commitment and involvement.    
 
“When I say I feel an attachment for the WTO, its not the economic philosophy (…) 
I’m talking more about the colleagues (…) I like to work for development, and that is 
nice in my division, that everybody works for the interest of developing countries. 
(…)” (WTO 2) 
 
“Being in the development division, we tend to become more sensitive to the concerns 
of developing countries.” (WTO 4) 
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“I have an attachment to the WTO, and I have a special attachment to rules (rules 
division).” (WTO 9) 
 
The Secretariat derives its legitimacy from the member states, which frequently seek its 
expert advice, yet at the same time are sensitive to threats towards their authority and 
supremacy. The Secretariat thus depends on a great amount of trust from the member states 
and is careful not to push the limits too far. The formal implications of neutrality are an 
important consideration for the civil servants. There is an overall agreement on the 
importance of being perceived as impartial. 
 
“They (the member states) come to you because they trust you. If they don’t trust you, 
or feel that you are more biased towards one part of the membership, and not towards 
the other, it becomes difficult.” (WTO 2) 
 
The Secretariat is a comparatively small bureaucracy with a relatively low turnover. 
Especially officials with long tenure have commonly worked on different portfolios and in 
different positions. Most officials have an extensive immediate network and report various 
forms of contact patterns and communication with their colleges and superiors. Some 
respondents also draw direct linkages between their long history of employment in the 
Secretariat and attachments towards their portfolios.  
4.3.3 Epistemic dynamics 
Essential to its role as provider of expert advice and guidance, knowledge and expertise are 
the building blocks of the Secretariat. An eligible candidate for the Secretariat staff is well 
educated, experienced and specialized on trade-related issues.  
 
”The organization is serviced by a small Secretariat, the professional staff of which 
consist primarily of economists and lawyers specialized in international trade policy. 
A person wishing to apply for such a position in the Secretariat should possess a post-
graduate university degree in economics, international relations or law, with an 
emphasis on trade issues. The academic qualifications should be supplemented by at 
least five years of experience with a national government or with an international 
organization or other organizations or enterprises dealing with issues of trade policy 
and international trade relations.” (WTO 2014d) 
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Mouritzen (1990 in Trondal et. al 2004:11) emphasized the relationship between 
organizational autonomy and recruitment procedures. Different recruitment procedures are 
assumed to affect conduct and role-perceptions differently. Recruitment based on merit 
provides neutral, permanent civil servants on the basis of competence (Trondal et. al 2004). 
As mentioned in previous sections, nationalities are evidently of lesser importance, 
particularly to the civil servants themselves. The officials often express that their identities are 
strongly linked to their role as experts and advisors and take great pride in their work and 
professions.  
 
On nationalities: “I’m not sure if it’s important to the staff, because at least the staff 
wants to believe that they are a body of experts.” (WTO 5) 
 
Virtually all of the respondents possess post-graduate degrees in either law or economics with 
specialization in trade-related issues. There is a variety of former institutional affiliations, the 
majority have at least a few years of professional experience from various organizations, 
national as well as international. A consequence of such meticulous hiring objectives is an 
extensive network of highly professional civil servants whose knowledge and skills are 
recognized and relied upon by the member states. Not surprisingly, such capacities and 
responsibilities promote a third set identity perception, namely the role as an expert and 
researcher.  
 
“For many delegations we are very trusted, like mediators, or we are trusted experts in 
technical issues (…)” (WTO 2) 
 
The WTO generally employs on permanent basis and do not employ seconded experts to the 
same extent as the Commission (Trondal et. al 2004). The interviews confirm that long tenure 
within the Secretariat is common, as is circulation of personnel within the Secretariat. 
 
The diligent work of the Secretariat staff is widely acknowledged and admired among 
professionals. Coupled with a remarkable level of specialization and expertise renowned to be 
the highest within the field of trade-relations, the dynamic and challenging work environment 
of the Secretariat attracts professionals from all over the globe. Many of the respondents 
indicate that it was their professional expertise led them to seek employment in the 
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Secretariat. When asked about the motivation for entering a position in the Secretariat, one 
official answered: 
 
“(…) when I was a delegate I always had the highest respect and regard for the quality 
of work produced by the Secretariat. In those days, in the Uruguay round, the 
Secretariat was called upon to do what was called background papers. They were 
really high quality research material (…) And also what really struck me was the 
expertise.”  (WTO 13) 
 
Due to the fact that civil servants are invested with knowledge required by the member states 
to create policies and outcomes, they subsequently enjoy a significant degree of flexibility and 
freedom. Because expertise is the guiding principle of decision-making, it lies within the 
nature of professional networks that rigid working procedures and guidelines from outside 
authorities are more likely to halter progress than to encourage it. Generally, officials do not 
have clear-cut work descriptions and often feel like they do have some degree of leeway in 
expressing their opinions and conducting their work.   
 
“I have quite a bit of discretion, but it’s partly because of my recognized expertise in 
the area (…) I think it varies a lot among colleges depending on their level of expertise 
or recognized level of expertise, but certainly when you have been working in the area 
as long as I have, most of our members and delegates I think recognize that and they 
accept that how much freedom really depends on the situation.” (WTO 15) 
 
“We have a lot of freedom because we have a lot of expertise (…)” (WTO 16) 
 
It follows that traditional hierarchies are of less importance. Many of the respondents indicate 
that the hierarchical control mechanisms are rather loose, and that they are more inclined to 
look to their Director or colleges for instructions or endorsement. Moreover, disagreements 
are often laced along disciplinary lines and specific kinds of knowledge. It thus appears that 
both synergy and conflicts within the Secretariat often are entrenched in scientific research 
and proficiency activated by epistemic behavioural dynamics.  
 
The dominating professions in the Secretariat have strong traditions and many of the 
respondents report cultivating contacts to their academic communities. This does not only 
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ensure updated and expanded knowledge within their fields, moreover it allows them to 
nourish their identities as experts and researchers. 
  
4.4 Summing Up 
WTO holds a key position on the global stage as the only international organization dedicated 
to regulating and overseeing trade between nations. It has progressively developed into a 
powerful and complex organization providing an encompassing rule-based framework on 
international trade. Yet, shifting economic circumstances, advancements within technology 
and new players on the market constantly present new challenges, additionally, the WTO is 
repeatedly criticized for neglecting the needs and demands of the developing nations.  
 
Though formally sanctioned as the purely administrative arm of the organization, there is 
growing support for the claim that the WTO Secretariat holds substantial potential to 
influence and shape the outcomes of WTO policies and politics. Its invaluable role as 
institutional memory, knowledge base and body of expertise provides a range of possibilities 
to supply inputs into the global system. The civil servants thus find themselves amidst formal 
constraints and informal latitudes, obligated to neutrality and driven by personal conviction 
and affiliations. This chapter attempted to illuminate the underlying question of subsequent 
effect on self-perceptions and behavioural patterns by highlighting the findings relating to 
three such behavioural dynamics.   
 
The Secretariat evokes multiple roles and identities among staff members. These seem to be 
dependant upon situation and circumstance and may often occur simultaneously. Secretariat 
staff is comprised of a variety of nationalities, yet the majority share similar educational and 
professional background in which international connections appear to be a reoccurring factor. 
Overall, the officials report relatively long tenure within the Secretariat. Supranational 
behavioural dynamics are particularly evident through professed allegiances to the 
overarching global cause and a genuine belief in the WTO mission. Departmental behavioural 
logics are facilitated through favourable organizational structures that stimulate strong 
orientations towards units and portfolios. Lastly, as a consequence of increased 
professionalization of international bureaucracies, epistemic behavioural dynamics unfold 
themselves through the accumulation of prestigious expertise.  
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5. Analysis and Conclusion 
 
This chapter summarizes and presents the research and subsequent analytical insights. The 
data obtained through the interviews as well as relevant documents have been processed and 
evaluated in response to the research question posed in chapter 1: 
 
To what extent are WTO officials independent, and what can account for actor-level 
autonomy in the WTO Secretariat?  
 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2 
against the empirical observations outlined in chapter 4. The ambition is to understand actor-
level autonomy in particular and behavioural dynamics more generally in the light of the three 
theoretical conjectures presented in previous chapters. This study assumes that the 
behavioural dynamics enacted by civil servants are biased by mechanisms of pre-
socialization, re-socialization and organizational affiliations. The following analysis intends to 
illuminate, firstly, how actor-level autonomy evolves and prospers within the WTO 
Secretariat, and secondly, how such independence is conceived and refined. The chapter is 
completed by a concluding section that sums up the study and highlights the main findings.  
5.1 Actor-Level Autonomy in the WTO Secretariat 
The Secretariat is an autonomous actor in the broader sense of global governance in that it is 
invested with the potential to produce independent effects by operating above the level of 
interstate cooperation. If taken to the uttermost extent, actions and intentions that run beyond 
member state control may be pushed onto the international stage and from thereon infuse 
various levels of governance. International bureaucracies, like the WTO Secretariat, may thus 
present a challenge to nation states.  Because the Secretariat is entrusted with a wide range of 
responsibilities and tasks, the potential to wield influence on policies and outcomes are 
greatly enhanced. Though it remains comparatively small in size, the Secretariat has 
undergone significant changes the past years; it has increased in scope, function and size and 
it has manifested itself as an imperative platform of knowledge, expertise and institutional 
memory on the global trade arena. As foreseen by institutional theory, the Secretariat has 
taken on a life of its own.  
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The empirical inquiry indicates that the abovementioned features of the Secretariat equip the 
civil servants with the power to influence and shape process and outcomes. It is also shows 
that the majority of the civil servants are aware of the possibilities and potential to do so.  The 
extent to which such discretion is exercised, however, remains unclear, though one may 
assume that this will vary according to the nature of the specific task or assignment as well as 
personal convictions and preferences. Several of the respondents expressed personal interest 
and commitment towards their respective fields of operation, and it seems reasonable to 
assume that their views also will be reflected in the sum of their work. This further 
demonstrates the importance of assessing the development and implications of values, norms 
and preferences office-holders of international bureaucracies.    
 
One implication of this increase in scope and function is a larger degree of specialization, 
which, as predicted by organizational theory, leads to more formalization. This development 
appears to be confirmed by the respondents. The Secretariat may be compared to a national 
bureaucracy in that it is organized by purpose, and staffed by civil servants whose main task is 
the execution of technical and administrative tasks. An important distinction must be made 
between formal and informal powers. Formal powers are fairly straightforward and limited 
but they do equip the staff with some fundamental capacities to exert influence. Combined 
with informal powers, there is considerable room to affect policies and outcomes. The 
informal powers stem from interpersonal relationships and networks, norms and culture and 
are driven by personal viewpoints. As mentioned in chapter 2, an important source of 
informal power is expertise as this automatically implicates a larger degree of leeway given 
that political authorities generally do not interfere with knowledge-based work. The empirical 
material demonstrates that this is also the case within the Secretariat. Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy that the civil servants are attentive towards the gap between formal and informal 
powers. The connection between informal powers, discretion and potential to influence 
outcomes becomes increasingly evident. Overall, informal processes appear to run parallel to 
formal ones. It is also interesting that the empirical inquiry indicates that such informal 
processes may also be initiated by member states in that they turn to the Secretariat for advice 
and guidance on particular issues, including ones that are not formally on the table. Such 
informal contact patterns between Secretariat staff and member state delegations provide 
sizable room for influence in that it gives the civil servants the opportunity to shape thinking 
by directing attention towards certain issues rather than others. However, there appears to be a 
fine line between accepted amounts of informal contact pattern and the need to uphold the 
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formal principle of neutrality. It is important that the civil servants are not perceived as biased 
towards one membership more than towards others. Thus, though informal contact patterns 
are common and extensive, the civil servants are careful not to step too far out of their official 
domains. Formal restrictions and possible repercussions from the member states thus appear 
to limit the exertion of influence.  
 
In response to the aforementioned changes of the Secretariat, that is, increase in scope and 
size; there is an evident growth of multidimensionality, primarily externalized through an 
entangled set of behavioural logics enacted by the civil servants. Officials possess multiple 
identities and often shift from one identity to another. Context and circumstance are typically 
responsible for determining which identity moves to the foreground. Supranational, epistemic 
and departmental behavioural dynamics are not mutually exclusive and are often interacting 
and overlapping. Though it is possible to draw some general conclusions on enactment of 
these dynamics, the degree to which officials feel affiliated to them varies from individual to 
individual.  
 
Supranational, departmental and epistemic behavioural dynamics are all enacted to various 
extents within the Secretariat. However, the overall impression from the empirical inquiry 
indicates an especially strong degree of departmental behavioural logics. Such behavioural 
patterns are conveyed in that much attention is given to various aspects relating to sub-units. 
Besides taking pride in their work and positions, civil servants also appear to connect a sense 
of meaning to it. It is thus not surprising that loyalties, personal commitments and interests 
towards divisions are repeatedly emphasized. Given the theoretical posture outlined in chapter 
2, notably section 2.2.3, it does also appear reasonable to draw the conclusion that the 
organizational structure of the Secretariat is largely responsible for evoking such inward-
looking orientations. Although departmental logics often stand slightly at the forefront, 
supranational and epistemic behavioural logics are also clearly present.   
 
Because the responsibilities and goals of the divisions relate to the overall objectives of the 
WTO, a certain belief in the global causes advocated by the organization, is arguably 
necessary in order for the civil servants to fully commit to their work in the sub-units. More 
often than not civil servants seem to be prone to the ideas represented by the WTO, often even 
prior to entering their positions, which arguably relates to pre-socialization (see next section). 
It also appears that such supranational behavioural dynamics are further consolidated at the 
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organizational level, assumably as a result of re-socialization (see next section). Nationalities 
appear to be rather insignificant during recruitment; much more emphasis is placed on 
educational and professional backgrounds.  The recruitment system thus ensures a culturally 
diversified staff with similar educational and professional backgrounds, which would imply 
the encouragement of supranational and epistemic behavioural dynamics in particular.  
 
Furthermore, strong horizontal specialization and subsequent departmental behavioural logics 
are correlative to epistemic behavioural dynamics, primarily due to the fact that specialization 
implicates the accumulation of expertise through the employment of highly educated civil 
servants. The fact that the divisions under scrutiny are dominated highly specialized 
professions, namely lawyers and economists with similar specializations and professional 
experiences, suggest a rather homogenous group of professionals. It could be contended that 
this sort of uniform workforce enhances the development of epistemic behavioural dynamics. 
For many civil servants, the renowned work of the Secretariat strengthens the imperative to 
seek employment, which indicates professional pride and the desires to excel at their 
respective domains. Additionally, the Secretariats’ strict recruitment procedure ensures a top-
level group of professionals. This considered, epistemic behavioural dynamics are bound to 
be an inevitable component of Secretariat staff. To sum up, it is evident that the three 
behavioural dynamics are closely interrelated and even mutually reinforce each other. 
Departmental behavioural dynamics do appear to stand out, although they are closely 
followed by epistemic and supranational behavioural logics. Departmental behavioural 
dynamics are arguably largely a product of the organizational framework, i.e. horizontal 
specialization. Epistemic behavioural logics primarily emanate from professional 
backgrounds and expertise, and supranational behavioural dynamics may arguably be the 
underlying pre-condition for the two aforementioned to fully externalize themselves.  
5.2 Explaining Actor-Level Autonomy 
The empirical inquiry confirms that the explanatory value of the independent variables is 
diversified. As expected, these impact to various degrees on the behavioural dynamics. As 
described in chapter 2, this study expects to find that pre-socialization primarily impacts on 
supranational behavioural dynamics, while mechanisms of re-socialization are mostly 
reflected in departmental and epistemic behavioural dynamics and lastly, organizational 
affiliations are predicted to principally influence departmental behavioural logics.  
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5.2.1 Pre-socialization  
The empirical inquiry lends support to the claim that mechanisms of pre-socialization amplify 
the development of supranationally oriented civil servants by exposing them to favourable 
conditions prior to entering positions in the Secretariat. Pre-socialization appears to impact 
primarily on supranational behavioural dynamics, followed by epistemic behavioural logics.  
 
Preconditioned by their genuine belief in the global system, officials perceive themselves as 
contributors for the global benefit. The empirical material clearly indicates that the civil 
servants feel a stronger attachment towards the international community than towards their 
nation states. One could argue that nationalities become increasingly blurred and insignificant, 
which seems to be particularly true for civil servants who have devoted most of their lives to 
the service of the international community. Though it is assumed that previous engagements 
with international organizations may increase supranational orientation, the empirical inquiry 
does not provide substantial evidence to draw conclusions on the effect on type of previous 
organizational affiliations. Because the majority of the respondents share similar educational 
and professional backgrounds and have been involved with international questions prior to 
entering their positions in the Secretariat, it is not possible to account for the isolated effects 
of these two proxies. The empirical material does show, however, that international 
backgrounds, be it educational, professional or a combination of both, are positively related to 
the progression of supranational behavioural dynamics.  
 
It would be highly unlikely that such attitudes are consequence of in-house socialization 
mechanisms entirely, and it thus seems reasonable to put forward the claim that such attitudes 
are already infused and nurtured through various processes occurring prior to employment. 
Through international educational and professional backgrounds, there is certain familiarity 
associated with an international environment and it is generally reasoned that individuals are 
often drawn towards what they are accustomed to. As established in the forgoing chapter, the 
officials share similar educational and professional backgrounds in that they have attended 
international universities and/or have been in contact with international actors and questions 
through previous professional engagements. It seems evident that individuals with 
international backgrounds are more inclined to adopt a broader and more global perspective 
and chose their career paths accordingly. In an even narrower sense, the delimited field on 
which the Secretariat operates attracts professionals who are specialized and experienced in 
trade-related issues. The empirical material indicated that one rationale for applying for a 
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position at the Secretariat was the desire to be a part of an eminent community of experts, 
which relates to epistemic behavioural dynamics. A second reasons appears to be the 
opportunity to contribute to and engage in the international community. Arguably, the civil 
servants have pursued career paths that appeal to their core values and beliefs. This 
strengthens the assumption that pre-socialization mechanisms are decisive in predicting 
attitudes, perceptions and subsequent behavioural dynamics. These findings are in accordance 
with the theory of representative bureaucracy. Attributes of the demographic profile of the 
civil servants are indirectly contributing to the outcomes of policies by pre-programming 
values and beliefs, and thereby also patterns of conduct. Additionally, by applying strict 
recruitment and selection policies, the Secretariat ensures a culturally diversified and 
international staff.  
 
Based on these data it would thus be reasonable to conclude that there is unequivocal support 
for the assumption that pre-socialization mechanisms impact significantly on supranational 
behavioural dynamics. In this case, this relates primarily to educational and professional 
backgrounds. The data does not provide abundant evidence to make any conclusions 
regarding the relationships between age and gender on one side and supranational behavioural 
dynamics on the other.  
 
As already touched upon, more direct casual links can be drawn between pre-socialization 
mechanisms and epistemic behavioural dynamics since expertise and knowledge relate back 
to educational and professional backgrounds. Overall, officials feel strongly connected to their 
disciplines and professions. Again, it is worth remarking that recruitment procedures play a 
crucial part in ensuring highly qualified personnel and consequently also in fostering a strong 
epistemic culture. The empirical material appears to support the theoretical claim that officials 
with international educational and professional backgrounds are more inclined to view 
themselves as independent sector experts rather than national representatives. It is also 
noteworthy that the length and type of education arguably also contributes to the evolvement 
of both supranational and epistemic behavioural logics. While law and economics does not 
itself necessarily imply international occupations, specialization in trade-related issues on the 
other hand, may foster a latent preference for, and bias towards, cross-national objectives, 
systems and processes.  
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The effects of pre-socialization on departmental behavioural logics appear to be limited. It 
could, however, convincingly be argued that loyalty to divisions are preconditioned by 
loyalties to the organization, i.e. global cause, as a whole. It follows that there is an indirect 
conjunction between pre-socialization and departmental behavioural patterns.  
 
In sum, pre-socialization appears to impact severely on supranational behavioural dynamics, 
followed by epistemic behavioural logics. Overall the empirical inquiry confirms the 
theoretical assumptions presented in chapter 2. Though given the prestigious educational 
backgrounds and the subsequent extensive professional experiences as experts, it may even be 
argued that mechanisms of pre-socialization potentially impact more or less alike on these two 
behavioural logics. As established in section 5.1 behavioural dynamics may vary from person 
to person, which makes it reasonable to assume that pre-socialization mechanisms may unfold 
themselves more strongly either in epistemic or supranational behavioural logics, however, 
contingent upon individual personalities. Pre-socialization mechanisms are less evident in 
departmental behavioural dynamics, yet there is compelling reason to assume that 
departmental behavioural logics are conditioned by some degree of supranational orientation.  
5.2.2 Re-socialization 
The WTO has successfully institutionalized global trade and become a powerful player in the 
field of global governance. It has incorporated core values into a wide range of policies, 
processes, systems and procedures. Attitudes, values and norms are consolidated and 
embedded at the organizational level. As anticipated by constructivist and institutionalist 
theories, the organizational context of the Secretariat fuels the emergence – and reinforces 
already existent supranational identity perceptions.  
 
The fairly low level of conflict among incumbents suggests likelihood of alignment of values 
and culture and it seems reasonable to assume that this is largely a result of processes of 
socialization. As predicted by institutional theory, existing values and beliefs may be 
modified by sustained interaction and involvement in an organization. Given that the 
Secretariat has become institutionalized, one may expect that behaviour to some extent will be 
the aggregate of collective norms, values and beliefs. Combined with little disagreement, the 
fact that officials often look to colleagues or direct superiors for advice may arguably imply a 
set of shared opinions and an overall consensus on the majority of issues. This in turn, 
provides strong indications of the dissemination of norms, culture and values, i.e. it is likely 
that mechanisms of re-socialization are at play. Consequently, there is substantial ground to 
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argue that a logic of appropriateness motivates officials within the Secretariat to act in 
accordance with what is perceived to be appropriate given the prevailing norms and values.  
This may account for relatively little disagreement within the Secretariat.  
 
The main theoretical premise behind the neofunctionalist approach to re-socialization is that a 
positive relationship between potential of re-socialization on one hand, and duration and 
intensity of interaction among actors on the other (Egeberg et.al 2013). The longer officials 
remain in the Secretariat, the more they become exposed to supranational values and attitudes. 
Low turnover and long tenure in the Secretariat are thus in all probability significant 
contributors to supranational behavioural dynamics. Officials with long tenure are assumed to 
express a more profound belief in a supranational community than newer staff members. The 
substance of this particular claim, however, remains somewhat inconclusive in the data given 
that the respondents in this study generally report fairly long tenures within the Secretariat. A 
comparison with officials of shorter incumbency may possibly have provided ground to draw 
clearer conclusions. Yet, it is indeed noteworthy that long tenure and evidence of re-
socialization mechanisms coincide in this study. On a different note, one effect of longer 
periods of employment in the Secretariat appears to be an enhanced sense of ownership 
towards their positions and work. Many of the civil servants have first-hand experiences of 
processes of change and expansion and have contributed to build and shape the Secretariat to 
what is today. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that such experiences may strengthen 
processes of socialization.  
 
Similarly, extensive contact patterns and interaction amongst officials are likely to enhance 
socialization processes, i.e. accustom officials to collective attitudes and beliefs. Empirical 
findings indicate that intra-unit contact patterns are more frequent that inter-unit interaction. 
The fact that the vast majority of interaction takes places between colleges within the same 
units also indicates that re-socialization may impact primarily on departmental and epistemic 
behavioural logics.  
 
Reflecting the international atmosphere of Geneva, the Secretariat is dominated by a 
multicultural workforce. Nationalities are overshadowed by social interaction across national 
backgrounds and boundaries, both at the professional and private level. Continuous exposure 
to such extensive networks of cultural diversity seem likely to increase detachment from 
national backgrounds, which in all probability also implicates that overall national preferences 
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and interests of respective governments become of lesser significance. This line of argument 
would imply that the institutional and social context facilitate socialization processes that first 
and foremost enhance supranational behavioural dynamics as the civil servants ultimately feel 
a stronger sense of belonging to the international community.  
 
All the above considered leads to the conclusion that mechanisms of re-socialization first an 
foremost impact on departmental and epistemic behavioural dynamics, principally due to 
regular exposure to sectorial objectives, norms and culture that arise from the organizational 
structure. Incidentally, organizational architecture indirectly manifests itself as a determinant 
for behavioural dynamics. Furthermore, assuming that supranational behavioural dynamics 
constitute the bedrock of the remaining two behavioural logics, it could also convincingly be 
argued that re-socialization to a certain degree also consolidates supranational attitudes and 
beliefs.  
5.2.3 Organizational affiliation  
Permanent and long-term contracts imply continuity of personnel, which effectively implies 
that the WTO represents the primary organizational affiliation for the vast majority of its 
office holders.  This inevitably impacts on supranational behavioural logics. In a more narrow 
sense officials additionally feel strongly affiliated to their subunits. Due to strong horizontal 
differentiation, organizational affiliation seems to impact primarily on departmental 
behavioural logics.  
 
The structure of the Secretariat reaffirms the role of horizontal specialization in fostering 
departmental behavioural dynamics. Strong portfolio allegiances are a reoccurring 
observation throughout this entire study. Although the respondents essentially identify 
themselves as WTO officials, they attach substantial weight to their departmental identities. 
Coupled with weak administrative capacities at the top level, the specialized structure of the 
Secretariat encourages intra-unit contact patterns while limiting interaction across levels of 
authority. Consequently, civil servants become more inward looking and orient themselves 
towards their units. This is in accordance with the theoretical assumptions outlined in chapter 
2. The empirical inquiry thus appears to support the claim that affective ties are made 
primarily towards divisions and sub-units and to a slightly lesser extent to the organization in 
general. As expected, affiliations to national governments are weak.  
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The theoretical framework suggests that bureaucratic structure is an important determinant of 
role and identity perceptions. The organizational structure of the Secretariat verifies this claim 
in that it clearly fosters allegiances towards sub-units (departmental behavioural dynamics). 
The findings indicate that several of the respondents view themselves as neutral experts who 
orient their preferences towards sectorial objectives. Although conflicts appear to be rather 
rare, they generally take place along sectorial lines. The empirical material reveals that 
cooperation is most common within units and that cross-unit collaboration occurs rather 
infrequently in comparison.  
 
The hierarchical structure thus does not appear to reflect the de facto power constellations of 
the Secretariat. In a strong hierarchy one would expect a rather inflexible structure with 
authority concentrated with a few top officials, whereas the respondents describe a general 
lack of hierarchical control mechanisms in the Secretariat, primarily externalized through 
considerable room for manoeuvre among personnel. It follows that there is a tangible 
discrepancy between formal and actual power. As indicated previously, such flexibility is 
often associated with the evolvement of epistemic behavioural dynamics. A relatively 
reserved upper management is reflected in the successive hierarchical structure. Although the 
top-level officials hold formal authority, their roles and presence in the daily operations of the 
Secretariat are generally kept to the sidelines. In sum, the organizational setting of the 
Secretariat is effectively more dominated by horizontal structure and less so by its hierarchical 
architecture.  Such observations are in line with the theoretical premise outlined in section 
2.2.3. Because the administrative capacities of the Secretariat are fairly weak, vertical 
specialization does not impact as strongly as arguably could have been the case.  Mechanisms 
of organizational affiliation clearly impacts strongly on departmental behavioural logics.  
5.3 Summing Up 
The foregoing sections attempted to illuminate actor-level autonomy in the Secretariat as well 
as the effects of pre-socialization, re-socialization and organizational affiliation on 
behavioural dynamics. Section 5.1 discussed actor-level autonomy. The first main conclusion 
drawn is that there is considerable room for civil servants to exert influence on policies and 
outcomes. As theorized, these capacities largely arise from the Secretariats formal role as key 
provider of knowledge-based technical support. The empirical inquiry shows that informal 
interaction and processes frequently occur in the Secretariat and that these processes enhance 
the possibilities to influence policies and outcomes. Secondly, the empirical material confirms 
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that supranational, departmental and behavioural dynamics occur to various degrees and 
under various circumstances. Departmental behavioural dynamics appears to be slightly more 
dominant than the remaining two. Section 5.2 evaluated the theoretical premises of pre-
socialization, re-socialization and organizational affiliation against the three behavioural 
dynamics. Based on the empirical observations, the following conclusions were drawn: firstly, 
mechanisms of pre-socialization impact primarily on supranational behavioural dynamics. 
Secondly, re-socialization largely influences departmental and epistemic behavioural 
dynamics. And thirdly, in addition to being a strong determinant of behavioural dynamics, 
organizational affiliation is resolutely related to departmental behavioural logics. This study 
consequently supports the theoretical assumptions outlined in section 2.2. 
5.4 Final Conclusion 
This thesis set out to examine the complex and intertwined layers and dynamics of actor-level 
autonomy within the WTO Secretariat. The main motivation behind choosing this particular 
subject as a field of study was a renewed scholarly interest in international permanent 
secretariats, as well as a general lack of PA studies of international executives. While 
traditional PA studies have been criticized for ‘methodological nationalism’ (Bauer and 
Trondal 2015), traditional IR scholarship has proved insufficient in explaining the 
developments and subsequent dynamics that continue to unfold themselves on the 
international stage.  Actor-level autonomy is a broad and somewhat diffuse term. Empirical 
evidence suggest that international bureaucracies have significant potential to influence and 
shape the outcome of world politics, primarily due to their role as experts and advisors in 
technical issues. The acknowledgement of international bureaucracies as shapers of world 
policies compels the question of underlying motivations and driving-forces of the civil 
servants (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009). Establishing role perceptions, values and 
preferences provides indicators and explanations of behaviour and patterns of conduct, which 
in turn may account for the outcome of decision-making within the organization.  
 
The study consisted of two main components. The first part is descriptive and intended to 
address actor-level autonomy within the WTO Secretariat by examining three behavioural 
dynamics, namely supranational, departmental and epistemic behavioural logics. The second 
part is explanatory and aspired to explain the emergence and development of the three 
behavioural dynamics in view of the mechanisms of pre-socialization, re-socialization and 
organizational affiliation. The study builds on research conducted by Trondal et. al (2010) and 
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Egeberg et. al (2013) and was executed by re-analysing a set of 19 interviews with officials 
working within the WTO Secretariat. Additionally, the study drew on official documents and 
secondary literature.  
 
The empirical inquiry and subsequent discussion established that the Secretariat is an 
autonomous actor in the broader sense in that it has the powers to influence and shape policies 
and outcomes through formal and informal channels. Furthermore, it also confirmed that 
supranational, departmental and epistemic behavioural dynamics are frequently occurring and 
firmly entrenched throughout the institutional and organizational context of the Secretariat. 
These dynamics often reinforce each other and unfold themselves simultaneously.  
 
Behavioural dynamics and the mechanisms of pre-socialization, re-socialization and 
organizational affiliations are closely interrelated and entangled. Based on the theoretical 
framework and empirical inquiry, the following conclusions regarding the relationship 
between the dependant and the independent variable are drawn: firstly, pre-socialization 
impacts primarily on supranational behavioural logics. Moreover, this study supports the view 
that supranational behavioural dynamics is a pre-condition for departmental and epistemic 
behavioural dynamics to fully unravel at the organizational level. A certain degree of 
inclination towards the overall tasks and objectives of the Secretariat is required in order to 
fully commit to the sub-units and assignments. Secondly, re-socialization mainly affects 
departmental and epistemic behavioural dynamics. Thirdly, organizational affiliation is 
arguably the strongest determinant of behaviour and impacts heavily on departmental 
behavioural logics. Overall, this study confirms the theoretical assumptions outlined in 
chapter 2 and thus also recent studies of international administration (e.g. Egeberg et. al 
2013). 
 
This study targeted actor-level autonomy as enacted by civil servants in an international 
bureaucracy, which is a field that has been largely understudied. The vast majority of 
literature has been concerned with defining and theorizing formal autonomy, and little 
attention has been given to the ways in which such autonomy effectively externalizes itself in 
the day-to-day operations of administrative executives. Thus there is an explicit need for more 
research on de facto autonomy. Furthermore, although PA literature is attentive towards 
comparable cases, a criticism has been the lack of comparative studies (Derlien 1992). The 
  73 
current state of research thus calls for more comparative studies of international 
bureaucracies.  
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Appendix  
 
Interview guide to officials at the Commission, the WTO 
Secretariat, and OECD Secretariat 
(Trondal et. al 2010:208-209) 
 
 
Background 
 
What is your educational and professional background? 
For how long have you worked in your current institution/unit/portfolio? 
When, why, how and from where were you recruited to this institution? 
What are the main differences between working here and in previous positions? 
 
 
General institutional questions 
 
How would you generally describe your daily work? 
Currently, what issues are central in your work? 
What is your current position, rank, unit? 
Do you have a clear-cut work description? 
Inside your unit/division/portfolio, what issues cause divisions of opinions/conflict? (Are 
these large or minor conflicts?) 
 
 
Behavioural questions 
 
With whom do you regularly interact with at work? 
 
• Colleagues in your unit/division? 
• Other units/divisions/DGs? 
• Head of unit? 
• The top administrative leadership of your DG/institution? 
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• Domestic government institutions? – ministries/agencies (Within your own portfolio 
or across portfolios?) 
• External experts/universities/research institutions? 
• Industry/consultancies etc? 
• Other international bureaucracies? 
 
With whom do you regularly interact outside office? 
 
• Colleagues in your unit/DG? 
• Own nationals? 
• Other nationals? 
 
In general, what would you consider to be the most important contacts in your position? 
 
 
Personal perceptions 
 
Does your nationality or the nationality of your colleagues ‘matter’ with respect to your daily 
work? 
Has an esprit de corps developed within your unit/division? 
To what extent do you identify with or feel a personal attachment towards: 
 
• Your unit/portfolio? 
• Your institution as a whole (the Commission, the OECD Secretariat, the WTO 
Secretariat)? 
• Your profession, educational background? 
• The member-state central administrations? 
 
What kind of roles do you regularly emphasize at work? 
 
• As a representative for the institution as a whole (supranational)? 
• As a representative for the unit/portfolio (departmental)? 
• As a representative for your professional expertise (epistemic)? 
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• As a representative for the member states or for your own country of origin 
(intergovernmental)?  
 
What considerations are vital for you? 
 
• Your institution as a whole? 
• Your unit/division? 
• Your profession/expertise? 
• The member states? 
• Your policy sector/portfolio? 
• Formal rules and procedures within your institution/unit? 
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